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ABSTRACT

This thesis identifies and fortifies against a critical vulnerability in industrial
control system (ICS) security. A properly designed ICS security framework consists of a
multi-layered approach starting with heavy fortifications in information technology and
ending with control information of operational technology. Currently, ICS security
frameworks lack visibility and place blind trust in devices at the lowest level of the
control hierarchy. Attaining control data visibility at the lowest level of the control
hierarchy is critical to increasing the resiliency of an ICS security posture. This thesis
demonstrates how this data can be captured at the lowest level of the control hierarchy,
and then synthesized with existing network and system data to form a more complete
picture of operational technology’s behavior.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are used to control different forms of automation
and are classified into two main categories. There are Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). Each type of
control system has process defined inputs and outputs (I/O) which vary between different
use cases and applications. SCADA systems tend to be used for the automated
monitoring, flow, and distribution of necessary resources such as gas, electricity, water,
and material. DCSs tend to be utilized when controlling an automatic physical process in
an industrial control facility via Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs).
Together, these two types of systems comprise a large portion of ICSs found in an
industrial control facility. Every control system relies on a controller receiving control
inputs to produce control outputs which return feedback signals. The controller receives
these feedback signals and adjusts the controls accordingly. This concept is known as a
control feedback loop and is at the core of control system theory. Control inputs and
outputs are also reported to a DCS, which orchestrates higher level control and
organization between multiple control processes.
Protecting a facility’s capital, employees, and intellectual property is of utmost
importance. Therefore, the control systems entrusted with this duty, along with their
communication channels, must be reliable and secured. Additionally, control systems,
their supporting systems, and networks within the facility should be designed and
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assembled to be resistant and resilient to component degradation, as well as various
intrusions.
System Thinking
Industrial control facilities can be conceptualized as a system of systems. There
are communication systems, computer systems, security systems, control systems, etc. At
some point, each of these systems interact with each other within the facility and work
together to deliver services. Fully understanding the ICS environment requires an
understanding of how these systems interact with one another.
First, many systems are structured with many different channels of feedback. The
connectedness of systems means that they move together, rather than independent
subsystems. Within human nature and different cultures, humans tend to think in terms of
causality, where A causes B. However, that is not always the case as the universe is a
very complex system of systems, where often B may also cause A [11].
Second, all systems share common features. One such feature is the notion that
the capability of an overarching system will be greater than the sum of all system
components. Similarly, an understanding of system interfaces, components, and their
relationships, can lead to a greater understanding of system performance and reliability.
By understanding systems, security mechanisms can be implemented with greater
wisdom to their cascading side effects with the rest of the system. This way, security
features that are added to the whole security infrastructure can be more impactful by
protecting the attack surface while adding less vulnerabilities. The concepts defined in
system thinking are critical to understanding security challenges that modern ICS
environments face and aid in forming holistic engineering solutions.
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System Degradation & Security Threats
Computer systems, network systems, security systems, and control systems all
exist within the scope of an industrial control facility. This means that each of these
systems are subject to system degradation over time, and failures can vary from memory
cells not being freed, networking devices losing their speed or reliability, or erosion of a
motor’s axle. Each of these types of component degradation can lead to system-wide
degradation and, ultimately system-wide failures. Further, when lacking proper
evaluation, these failures may be unexpected, causing problems ranging from minor
inconveniences to catastrophic events.
A common sign that systems may be degrading is that the systems’ performance
and/or behavior lies outside the scope of the system boundaries. While these
discrepancies may be mild in nature, they can signal the initial degradation of a
component within the system. In control system environments, the consequences of
failure can range from the halting of production to physical damage to loss of human life
and capital. Monitoring and recognizing when control systems start to degrade is
essential. Detection of systems misbehavior can trigger corrective action. Critical
components must be identified and well maintained while operating efficiently. Systems
can be preemptively halted, inspected for degradation, and promptly repaired.
However, degradation is not the only cause of failures within ICS environments.
Another critical area of vulnerability comes from security threats. ICSs are used in many
different industries and nations globally, and for this reason are exposed to a wide variety
of types and severities of threats. The goals of these threat actors may vary, as do the
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) these threats follow. Intruders’ main goals tend
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to be espionage, intellectual property theft, damage to capital or human life, or the
shutting down of operations. Intruders could be industry rivals, criminal groups,
disgruntled insiders, foreign adversaries, etc. These threats may be divided into three
main categories: basic threats, advanced threats, or advanced persistent threats (APTs).
Basic threats generally stem from amateurs who employ well-known and
documented attacks such as social engineering, phishing attacks, or open-source attacks
which may be found in the open environment of the internet. While social engineering
attacks are considered simple or trivial, they are commonly used because human nature
can be coerced with far less effort than computer technology. Advanced threats stem
from developed hacker groups or industrial spies who may perform attacks such as
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, private data extraction, or extortion via the
use of more sophisticated attacks. APTs tend to be sophisticated, organized, and wellfunded attackers. They are usually employed by international adversaries who leverage
well-developed and cutting edge TTPs to perform new attacks which are referred to as
zero-day attacks. APTs are constantly advancing since once a cutting-edge attack has
been used, the attack vector loses value. The knowledge gained from the attack is
released for defense purposes, thereby making it available to amateur attackers.
Control Systems and Visibility
While SCADA systems are important to the continual operation of an industrial
control facility, most physical action resides within DCSs and their subcomponents. A
typical DCS will oversee multiple control systems participating in one or many advanced
control processes [6]. Within each control system governed by a DCS, multiple
components are integrated to achieve the control of a physical process. Figure 1.1 [26]

5
depicts an example of a DCS layout where multiple control processes are working in
parallel to achieve a goal of producing an output product from given input resources.
There are programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that are responsible for the observation
and control of a process. Such processes can include controlling the pressure inside of a
tank, the flowrate through a pipe, or the temperature of an oven. The PLC manages these
control outputs (pressure, flow, temperature, etc.) by sending an analog electrical signal
(current or voltage) to an actuator such as a pump, heater, motor, etc. The PLCs are
programmed with a control process that is oriented to control outputs, such as
temperature, by driving the actuators.

Figure 1.1

DCS Layout

However, this can only be achieved by knowing the current state of the system via
the usage of feedback signals. These feedback signals are returned from sensors that
inform the PLC of the system status. Such signals can include the actual pressure, flow,
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or temperature. With the known state of the system, the PLC can choose to adjust or
maintain the electrical outputs that drive the actuators. This concept is known as a control
feedback loop. Figure 1.2 depicts a typical control feedback loop.

Figure 1.2

Control Feedback Loop

One of the major challenges in protecting systems from degradation and cyber
threats is the concept of system visibility. System visibility is the concept of truthfully
knowing the state of a system with as little obfuscation as possible. In an environment
where detecting degradation and cyber intrusions are important, having extensive
visibility on a system is critical. However, when components degrade and attackers
infiltrate, the veracity of returned data which is used to detect these events begins to
erode. Sensors and PLCs may not report legitimate information when components
degrade or have been compromised by an attacker. Degradation and infiltration are
difficult to nearly impossible to detect, in part because security products do not collect
and process operational technology (OT) data.
To handle this paradoxical problem, a new solution must be derived that breaks
the paradox and allows for system visibility even in this face of degradation and cyber
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infiltration. This thesis contributes to the field of ICS security by presenting an additional
method of data acquisition that increases ICS visibility and data resiliency.
Thesis Topics
This thesis identifies what requirements are needed to make these systems
resilient and secure from anomalous device behavior, while limiting the false positive
problem that plagues anomaly detection solutions. This thesis also discusses what the
term resilient means in the context of ICS security, and thus give system administrators
and security engineers a well-defined perspective on which to construct solid foundation
upon which security mechanisms can be built.
This thesis reviews some of the vulnerable aspects of industrial control systems
infrastructure and provides infamous examples of exploits leveraged against these
vulnerabilities. This thesis presents the best cybersecurity practices utilized by ICSs and
critical infrastructure today. These practices consist of the removal of unwanted services,
data integrity, secure communication protocols, authentication and authorization,
intrusion detection systems, and network enclave.
The remainder of this thesis discusses a new type of data acquisition and control
monitoring system which may be employed at the lowest level of the control system
hierarchy, the physical environment. APTs may have already infiltrated facility networks,
infected PLCs, or compromised sensors or actuators. Additionally, control system
components such as sensors and actuators may degrade over time causing undesirable
system behavior. For this reason, this thesis recommends monitoring and recording the
physical responses of a system through an out-of-band channel of information. By doing
so, security systems gain visibility via an additional point of reference to detect degrading
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systems and the intrusions of adversaries which may alter or disrupt control process
behavior. This gap in intrusion detection has been recognized by researchers [2], and this
problem is addressed in the pages to follow.
Much of the work in the design and assembly of a data acquisition system is
documented in the later chapters of the thesis. The proposed data acquisition system is
capable of monitoring and recording the physical behavior of the systems under control.
With an out-of-band channel of information, the data acquisition system may be
employed as an additional lens and cross-reference to untrusted system signals. The data
acquisition system’s data can be synthesized with in-band network and system data. This
union of data may be used in the generation of alerts when discrepancies arise between
information being reported from PLCs, and the data being reported from the data
acquisition system. With such a system, system administrators can be alerted of
anomalous events and detect device degradation and infiltration when either event occurs.
With the data acquisition system, the previous statement holds true even if the existing
control infrastructure (ie. PLC) is reporting illegitimate data.
Layout of This Thesis
To thoroughly address the issues raised by this thesis, the following chapters are
structured in such a way as to give context to the proposed data acquisition system.
Chapter 2 presents the previous research related to this thesis and highlights existing
infrastructure, threats, and technology. Chapter 3 elaborates the broader context of this
thesis and gives perspective to the proposed resilience-bolstering control monitoring
system. Chapter 4 provides background into the underpinnings of the thesis involving
system thinking and data resiliency.
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The proposed data acquisition and control monitoring system is detailed in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 explains the hardware design of the proposed control monitoring
system. The software design and some control monitoring results are presented in
Chapter 7. Related future research and avenues of application are presented in Chapter 8.
Summary and conclusions are presented in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
Typical ICS Facility Structure
While the ICS is the core of automation and production in a facility, large
amounts of infrastructure exist to schedule, monitor, and supply all production processes
taking place. As industrial control facilities grow more sophisticated, the communication,
monitoring, and control is further abstracted for ease of management. For this reason,
multiple network layers are usually implemented between the facility’s marketing or
sales departments and the physical control processes. This ICS facility layout is known as
the Purdue Model for Control Hierarchy and provides a more layered approach to
facility-wide operation and security [5, 13, 14]. An example of an industrial control
facility layout following the Purdue Model for Control Hierarchy is presented in Figure
2.1 [30].
Larger ICS facilities may need to communicate with other entities such as
management, sales, and suppliers. To establish communication, an external network
connection is required to allow communications between facilities, suppliers, and
customers. The first layer of an ICS is an external network layer, where internet
communication and security are handled. Once sales have been made, the production
needs to be scheduled with the lower layers of the ICS facility to meet the demands of the
customers in a timely fashion. This layer is typically known as the enterprise layer, and
this is where highly abstracted systems allow enterprise users to manage resources and
schedule production to meet demands. To meet the demands of the enterprise layer,
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production schedules are achieved via the orchestration of engineers that understand the
operation of ICSs and their capacities. This layer is known as the supervisory layer,
where command and control of ICSs occurs to produce the desired quantity of product.
With a plethora of facility-wide information available, engineers may operate control
processes via some form of human-machine interface (HMI).
Once control has been executed by the engineers at the supervisory layer, the
control information is passed to the next layer. This layer is known as the field layer,
where the control inputs direct the ICSs to perform their control processes on the given
input resources. All the PLCs, sensors, and actuators exist here. These devices report
real-time information about the status of the control processes taking place.
The control layer is essentially a part of the field layer but is differentiated as the
control or physical process layer due to its composition of physical system components.
This is the layer where the physical processes are taking place, whether it be the
controlling of the pressure in a tank, the temperature of a weld, the flow rate of fluid, etc.
This thesis proposes that the control layer’s analog information may be extracted via an
out-of-band data acquisition system whose data can be synthesized with existing in-band
network data to gain visibility at the lowest level of the control hierarchy.
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Figure 2.1

Purdue Model for Control Hierarchy
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External Network
The external network layer within an ICS facility is needed to communicate with
external entities such as customers, suppliers, external management, and other businesses.
The internet is a giant connected web, and bad actors around the globe can communicate
and coordinate attacks against ICSs through this external facing network, making this
layer the single largest threat to an ICS facility. Many protections are put in place to
protect and isolate the internal facility networks from the external network.
The most typical protection put in place is known as a demilitarized zone (DMZ).
Figure 2.2 depicts the typical DMZ architecture and what services tend to reside in the
zone. The DMZ is a subnetwork that stands between the external network and the internal
network to filter out and verify all traffic entering the facility’s network domain [5, 13,
14]. Firewalls, intrusion detection systems, email and web servers, web services, and
other forms of network security are implemented inside the DMZ to serve as the first line
of defense.

Figure 2.2

DMZ Architecture
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Enterprise Layer
The enterprise layer or enterprise network is where all the information technology
(IT) infrastructure for the management and corporate side of an industrial control facility
resides. Typically, this enterprise network has access to the internet to make sales, contact
suppliers, and other types of communication necessary to keep the facility running. Inside
the enterprise layer, IT systems are leveraged schedule production, manage inventory,
schedule OT maintenance, and other corporate tasks.
Due to its external network connection, this layer’s connection to the internet has
the largest attack surface and poses the largest cyber threat. For this reason, there is also a
DMZ isolating network traffic into the supervisory and other lower network layers of the
ICS facility. In addition to network isolation, there are a myriad of different security
mechanisms that are implemented on the network and inside of all hosts and internetconnected devices that reside on the network. Much of these topics will be explained in
further detail in the section titled Best ICS Security Practices. The best approach involves
addressing the attack surfaces that exist to implement mitigation and protection
techniques, thereby providing the greatest amount of coverage. The goal is to leave
attackers with minimal to zero available options.
Supervisory Layer
As the exterior layers of the ICS facility are peeled back, the shift from IT to OT
technology occurs. The bridge between IT and OT technology mainly exists within the
supervisory layer. IT is needed to receive scheduling, resource, and maintenance
information from the enterprise layer. IT also reports production related statuses back to
the enterprise layer, the OT is properly driven and capable of controlling processes inside

15
of the field layer. Lastly, IT gathers ICS status information and employs various methods
of ICS security such as intrusion detection.
One of the main OT systems used today is SCADA. As the name implies, SCADA
retrieves status information about resource assets which may be scattered throughout a
facility or even different geographic locations. In addition to resources location, SCADA
systems keep track of the flow of resources and waste in and out of the industrial control
facility. SCADA is responsible for the maintaining the processes of resource importing
and waste removal that keep the facility afloat. By knowing both where resources are and
how they are flowing, SCADA can oversee and operate control processes. However,
SCADA systems are not responsible for the control processes which act upon the input
materials to produce the outputs.
The OT systems in the supervisory layer which handle the controlling of the
control processes are DCSs. DCSs are responsible for controlling one to multiple control
processes which consist of actuators, sensors, and one or more PLCs. DCSs are the
entities responsible for reporting feedback information between dependent control
systems, with the objective of aiding in the control of complex and interdependent control
processes. To meet the needs of the different control process stages that occur throughout
production, DCSs can reconfigure the PLCs and change their response characteristics.
As with the enterprise layer, network intrusions may take place, therefore it is of
utmost importance to isolate the field layer from the supervisory layer. Isolation is
employed to stop intrusions from propagating further down the control hierarchy. A final
DMZ is placed between these two layers to achieve isolation of the control network.
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Field Layer
The field layer of the industrial control facility is where control processes
physically take place. All the PLCs, actuators, sensors, and transport mechanisms exist
here. This layer receives OT information from the supervisory layer and orchestrates
necessary control processes to produce output products. Normally, multiple dependent
control processes are required to produce an output product. Each ICS and its subsystems
are controlled by at least one PLC that is programmed and supervised by a DCS in the
supervisory layer. The PLC relays process status information to maintain the flow of
production between interdependent processes. Within the field layer exists the final layer
of the control hierarchy, the control process layer.
Control Process Layer
The control process layer consists of all the physical devices involved in the
production at the facility. Analog electrical signals, whether it be current or voltage, are
generated to control actuators such as motors, and report control status information from
sensors such as a thermometer. At this layer of the control hierarchy, few solutions exist
for ensuring the physical security besides guns, guards, and gates. Additionally, very few
systems can even detect degradation or infiltration.
Considering the apparent control security deficiency, this thesis proposes that
there is vital information within the physical control inputs and outputs that may be
captured outside of the PLC. The physical signals can be captured and monitored by an
out-of-band data acquisition system to detect when mechanisms in the control process
layer have deteriorated or been compromised. Chapters 5 through 7 will detail the design
and implementation of such a system.
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Advanced Persistent Threats
APTs are highly sophisticated and spanning networks of organized adversaries
seeking to infiltrate the computer networks and systems of government, critical
infrastructure, corporations, medical and academic institutions, etc. APTs tend to be
either highly organized criminal groups or nation states who have plenty of time and
resources to find ways into these targets [19]. APTs bring the advent of zero-day attacks
that the world has never seen. The feature that separates APTs from other advanced
attackers is their ability to remain unnoticed and undetected for long periods of time
before making an attack.
APTs will use all available resources at their disposal to intrude into a network,
including social engineering attacks on humans, manufacturing or program defects in
hardware or software, common features in operating systems, compromising supply
chains, etc. Not only do these attacks require a plethora of manpower, resources, and
sophistication, but each APT has a distinct mode of operation that is documented. APTs
can reduce system complexity of large systems by strategically targeting the smaller and
less complex functions within the system. These subsystems are broken down,
understood, and leveraged in advanced attacks. The best way to vet against this pervasive
threat is by taking on the perspective of an outside intruder and analyzing the system to
find each element that may be corrupted, and therefore must be secured. In addition to
securing the system elements, it is necessary to verify the security and integrity of thirdparty vendors, supplies, and their networks.
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ICS Cyber-Attacks
Stuxnet
The most notorious and discussed attacks leveraged against ICSs around the
world is known as Stuxnet. Stuxnet is a dangerous computer worm that was discovered
during a cyber-attack against the Iranian nuclear program in 2010 [7]. The worm enabled
attackers to take control of multiple PLCs that were controlling nuclear centrifuges. The
worm was designed to settle itself inside the host computer, and after a designated period,
begin propagating to other hosts on the network in search of PLCs running the Siemens
Step7 software. It then released its payload, altering the firmware running in a PLC. Once
discovered, Stuxnet was found to have infected over 200,000 computers and destroyed a
large portion of the Iranian nuclear program’s centrifuges.
Stuxnet specifically targeted Windows based systems and exploited four zero-day
operating system vulnerabilities [7]. Stuxnet has many propagation techniques, allowing
it to spread laterally on a large computer network despite established securities. One
method for self-replication was through taking advantage of an exploit allowing for autoexecution of removable drives plugged in anywhere. Alternatively, the worm spread
through local area network (LAN) connections by leveraging an exploit of the Windows
Print Spooler which stores print jobs on the LAN. Another exploit Stuxnet leveraged was
through the server-wide filesystem protocol known as server message block (SMB),
which allowed Stuxnet to copy itself to other hosts. Lastly, Stuxnet copied and executed
itself through network shared resources or SCADA database server connections.
Once Stuxnet was on a host, it could begin searching for the Siemens Step7
software, responsible for programming and running PLCs. If found, Stuxnet would copy
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itself into Step7 projects to automatically execute when a project was loaded into a PLC.
Once inside of the PLC, Stuxnet utilized peer-to-peer LAN connections to update the
global status of the worm across all machines infected. Additionally, the virus took
advantage of privilege escalation vulnerabilities which allowed the PLC to contact
command and control servers and execute code. From there host information about the
PLCs and computers could be sent across a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP)
connection to a server controlled by the attacker [7].
Stuxnet proved to be devastating to the field of industrial control, because of its
ability to leverage multiple vulnerabilities to replicate, execute code, modify programs,
and report back status information, all while hiding itself and bypassing security.
Ukrainian Electrical Grid
Another great example of an attack against ICS environments was the cyberattack on the Ukrainian Electrical Grid in 2015. In late December of 2015, power outages
across large regions of Ukraine were reported as multiple 100kV and 23.35kV
substations had been compromised and shut down due to an attack on the power
company’s SCADA systems. The outage lasted several hours before the power company
had to assume manual control of each of these substations, but at that point, the outages
had affected approximately 225,000 customers.
Like Stuxnet, the attacker was sophisticated and organized in their attack, leveraging
multiple exploits and vulnerabilities to infiltrate and maneuver the internal systems of the
power company. The attacker gained access through spear phishing emails and malware
known as BlackEnergy 3, which were embedded inside of Microsoft Word documents
that unsuspecting employees downloaded and viewed. Once the attacker had a foothold
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inside of the IT portion of the power company, they were able to extract high-privilege
credentials to gain access to the SCADA and ICS networks [10].
Having the valid credentials gave the attacker a foothold. They then used a virtual
private network (VPN) connection including the valid credentials to enter the SCADA
and ICS networks. Once on the network, they either leveraged existing tools in the
environment or accessed commands from the human to machine interfaces (HMIs)
located at each of the substations. From there they were able to alter then delete system
records and logs to hide exact details on how the attack was performed. Lastly, the
attacker was able to shut down the electrical load systems all while performing a
telephone denial of service (DoS) attack against the call centers, stopping outage reports
from being received and acknowledged [10].
Best ICS Cybersecurity Practices
Industrial security, or security in general, requires an understanding of attack
vectors and attack surfaces. An attack vector is an avenue an attacker may take to gain
access to a computer network or host, or deliver a malicious payload. Systems may have
multiple attack vectors at different regions of the systems, such as network endpoints,
computer hosts, or even unsuspecting users. The assortment of all the system attack
vectors is known as an attack surface. The attack surface is always changing as system
components are modified and as new attacks are created and discovered. The defenses
include the disabling of unused features, data integrity mechanisms, authentication and
authorization systems, secure communication protocols, intrusion detection systems
(IDS), and network enclave. This chapter will cover some common attack vectors and
their defenses that comprise the typical ICS attack surface.
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Removal of Unnecessary Features
The most basic form of security used today is the removal of attack vectors from a
system entirely. Doing so reduces the attack surface available and can be accomplished
by removing or deactivating unused features, processes, ports, or connections of PLCs,
computer networks, computer hardware systems, or software applications. Figure 2.3
depicts the disabling of unused features in an IDC environment. In a PLC, there may be
input and output ports that are not being used but are still enabled, thereby introducing an
avoidable attack vector into the control system. In a computer network, there may be
unused network internet protocol (IP) addresses, unused physical or virtual network
ports, or unnecessary subnetwork connections in place. In a computer system, there may
be several elements not in use, including operating system services, network or peripheral
ports, or even needless applications. In a software application, there may be entire
libraries linked into the program space when only a few functions are being used. For
each of these circumstances, the best practice is to remove unused mechanisms from the
system as they provide avenues for an adversary to gain access and control of critical
systems and infrastructure. This simple practice can drastically reduce the attack surface
of a system.
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Figure 2.3

Disabling of Unused Features

Data Integrity
There are many attack vectors into hardware and software systems that involve
the unauthorized alteration of the data being used. From memory attacks to data
corruption, data integrity violations may be catastrophic to a computer system. In an ICS
facility, this may lead to attacker intrusion, program execution, or IP extortion. Therefore,
data integrity should be applied to every system and subsystem of the industrial control
system [17]. Data integrity practices are implemented in firmware, software, hardware,
memory storage, data communication, or file systems and operating systems.
Data integrity assurance functions within three scopes: integrity violation
avoidance, detection, and correction [17]. Avoidance is a practice of preventative action
meant to avoid certain types of data loss. Detection, the most common method of
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integrity assurance, identifies when there have been modifications to data. Correction is
the act of repairing data which has been lost, modified, or damaged. By itself correction
is useless and requires some form of detection to know when it is necessary to repair the
damaged data. Normally, detection and correction go hand in hand, and avoidance is an
extra precaution to form a well-rounded data integrity assurance policy within a system.
Avoidance
There are several commonly used methods of data integrity violation avoidance,
each providing a unique guarantee of the integrity of data being stored or transmitted.
The first and most utilized method is read-only memory [17]. By preventing certain
portions of memory from being written over by programs or users, data integrity
violations may be prevented. However, this method does not prevent software or
hardware glitches from damaging data and bypassing these built-in operating system
protections.
Another robust method of avoiding data integrity violations is the implementation
of cryptographic filesystems [17]. By maintaining confidentiality in system data,
attackers have no feasible or predictable way of causing real damage without any
knowledge of the data being modified. Without a key to the encrypted data, it is
infeasible to start overwriting random portions of data in the hopes of causing a system
crash, failure, or security breach. Additionally, authentication can be performed on the
encrypted data via a hash function to check the integrity of the data. However, like read
only memory, these memory protections are not immune to software and hardware
glitches or failures which may cause losses in data or storage in incorrect locations.

24
A more modern approach to protecting file systems through data integrity
avoidance is the usage of transactional file systems. This method journals every system
action as a transaction which is logged to always maintain the system in a recoverable
state [17]. One great example of a transactional file system is known as New Technology
File Systems (NTFS). In NTFS, several mechanisms besides journaling are employed to
protect the system from unexpected data integrity violations, whether they be caused by a
user or malicious attacker, or by software or hardware glitches.
Detection
Data integrity violations may be avoided, but some of causes of data integrity
losses are unavoidable in computer systems [17]. While detecting cannot repair or
recover lost data, it is necessary to first detect integrity violations before they may be
corrected. Mirroring or checksumming the data are the most trivial ways of detecting
integrity violations. To mirror, a complete copy of the data is made, and the pieces of
data are compared byte by byte. To run a checksum, the data is served as an input to
some one-way function, and the output is compared to a precomputed result stored at the
end of a section of data. If any discrepancies arise, then there was a modification to the
data somewhere. However, not only are these methods inefficient, but they can only
indicate whether there is an integrity violation, and not which piece of data is corrupted.
Another common method used in error detection today is known as Cyclic Redundancy
Checks (CRC) where blocks of data are protected by the appending of extra sequences of
data. The CRC performs Frame Check Sequences (FRC) to detect errors on a frame-byframe basis. This method is used in determining which piece of data has been corrupted
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without copying entire portions of data. It is much more efficient in terms of both time
and memory usage [17].
Integrity violation detection is also critical for network communications. If
messages are intercepted by an attacker, they may modify the data and perform a man-inthe-middle (MITM) attack. A MITM attack is when an attacker gets between two
endpoints of communication to secretly steal information, and possibly relay false
information to the receiver. One common way of securing communications against
altered information is to use Error Correction Codes (ECC). ECCs are additional pieces
of redundant information about packets of data which are used to tell whether
modifications or errors have appeared in the received data [17]. While these methods are
good, they are not fool-proof, and attackers can very precisely modify packets of data to
trick ECCs into thinking they have received unmodified data. A more secure, but more
resource intensive way of securing communications is to use some form or encryption
and/or authentication. By encrypting the data being sent, you not only make the data
confidential, but the data can also be proven to authentic and unmodified. Cryptographic
hashing functions may be used to produce a message authentication code (MAC) which
is then appended to a message being sent. When the message is received, the MAC can
be regenerated by the party which has the key and compared to the MAC that was sent. If
the MACs are different, an integrity violation in the transmitted data has occurred [17].
Correction
Half of the battle in correcting integrity violations when they occur is the
detection, while the other half of the battle is correcting the data that has been damaged.
There are methods in which correction is performed, and there are also methods which
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employ both detection and correction in the same algorithm. One of the most common
forms of integrity violation correction is achieved by the many implementations of
redundant arrays of inexpensive disks (RAID). RAID may be used to ensure the integrity
of a filesystem upon system bootup, but also ensures that the memory can be recreated if
one of the disks is attacked and vital data is lost. This method is known as RAID parity,
where additional parity codes are stored in each of the RAID disk, thus allowing
reconstruction of lost data when a violation is detected [17].
Another method of correcting and detecting data at the same time are ECCs,
which may be implemented in more than just communication protocols. Stored in ECCs,
there are at least three bits for every byte of information stored. While not memory
efficient, this method is able to detect as little as two-bit errors in each byte of data, and is
able to correct single-bit errors in the data. ECCs are commonly used in servers and
critical applications that cannot afford to lose large portions of data. Normally, to be able
to detect and correct N bits of information, the log2(N) bits are required to perform the
correction. There are many classes of ECCs, the most common being parity and
hamming-correction codes.
Forward Error Correction (FEC) is a form of ECC used on smaller portions of
information that may be used in memory, but are often used in lower-level
communication applications. In FEC, check bits are calculated on the transmitter side of
communication and are appended to a message to be checked on the receiver side. If any
differences are detected, the lost data can be reconstructed. FEC in its simplest form
sends redundant copies of packets across a channel. The most common forms of FEC are
hamming codes and Reed Solomon codes [17].
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ICS Data Integrity
Within an industrial control facility there are many computer systems, network
connected devices, and PLCs which require many forms of data integrity checking. Data
integrity protection on these systems may be divided into three categories: firmware or
OS integrity, program and memory integrity, and communication integrity.
The first category of ICS system data integrity involves the firmware, or OS of
ICS systems. If any data is manipulated within the firmware on these systems, the system
could crash, vital information could be altered or damaged, or escalated permissions
could be given to an adversary. To avoid this, it is recommended to frequently verify the
integrity of firmware by using a verification tool that confirms the integrity by recreating
and verifying a digital signature which is only re-creatable by the owners of the device.
The second category of ICS system data integrity involves the programs and
memory storage of the systems running within the ICS. The functionality and reliability
of the PLC software depend on the integrity of the program and instruction data of the
program being run. If improper programming techniques are used, programs may become
weak to integrity violation attacks, which give attackers an avenue of control within the
systems. A sophisticated attack may be able to change program instructions or data,
causing improper behavior of the ICS system. To avoid this, many forms of integrity
checks are recommended. To protect the integrity of data being used by the system,
integrity checkers which verify integrity of the program before execution, and online
integrity checkers which scan before every critical read or write operation are
recommended.
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The third area of ICS data integrity is the integrity of transient values being sent
to and received by an ICS system, which are used to make live decisions. This is more
challenging because the data is foreign to these systems. Integrity may be accomplished
by using secure communication protocols and live data integrity checking mechanisms.
These checks for data integrity and authenticity ensure the data being received is
legitimate and has not been tampered with.
By focusing on the data integrity of every system within an ICS, the system
boundaries become much stronger and it becomes much more difficult for a system to be
broken when its data has been altered by an adversary. Figure 2.4 depicts a simple
example of a computer system that performs data integrity checking on network
communications, data storage to external memory, PLC data and program integrity
checking, and lastly filesystem, integrity checking for the operating system.
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Figure 2.4

Data Integrity System

Authentication & Authorization
Another vital piece of system security and resiliency is understood by asking the
questions: “Who are you?” and “Are you allowed this resource?”. These questions
encapsulate the critical security aspects of authentication and authorization.
Authentication is the act of verifying the identity of the origin of data or commands sent
and received inside and between system boundaries. Authorization is the act of checking
and verifying whether the origin of the data or commands may have access to information
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or system functions. By controlling these security mechanisms, system boundaries
become much more secure and difficult to be breached by an attacker without necessary
credentials [5, 9, 13]. Authentication methods not only verify the origin of the data or
commands transmitted and received, but they also may be used to verify the integrity of
data that has been stored and later retrieved. Authorization also provides layered access to
systems so that only users with a need of access are granted it, reducing the overall attack
surface substantially. Together, authentication and authorization allow for secure access
to industrial control facility resources by legitimate users who should be using those
resources.
Authentication
The many different forms, methods, and applications of authentication are often
coupled with some form of confidentiality and data integrity. The origin of the data being
transmitted and seeking authentication is typically referred to as the claimant.
Authentication verifies the identity of the claimant by using one or many different
authentication factors [21]. The factors frequently used to authenticate the claimant are
the following:
1. Something the user knows: A password, PIN, or other piece of private
information held by the user.
2. Something the user owns: A hardware authenticator, a cellphone, software
certificate, or smartcard.
3. Something that qualifies the user: Something biologically unique to the user such
as a fingerprint, DNA sequence, or voice recognition.
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4. Something the user can do: Used less commonly in digital systems, a signature or
physical gesture.
Added strength of authentication comes from combining the methods of
authentication and the strength of the underlying authentication methods themselves.
Using more than one form of authentication is often referred to as Two-Factor
Authentication (TFA). For example, if someone stole a password, but does not have the
relevant hardware authentication device such as a smartcard, then with TFA the attacker
is denied access. However, while passwords may be easy to implement in a system,
passwords have a few vulnerabilities such as being leaked, stolen, or brute forced. Since
passwords may be leaked, stolen, or brute forced, one workaround to this vulnerability is
to only use the password once. This type of authentication is known as a one-time
password (OTP).
In addition to logging into networks or gaining access to services on a network via
password authentication, there are also secure authentication protocols which may allow
the private communication of authentication credentials over an unsecure medium such
as the internet. One of the oldest authentication protocols, known as Password
Authentication Protocol (PAP), is not a secure authentication protocol because user
credentials are sent as unmodified plaintext over the network. An upgrade to PAP is
known as the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP), where only
username credentials are sent over the network connection, then a unique challenge
message is generated and sent as a response to the client. The challenge message is then
appended to the password and sent through some form of hashing function, preferably a
keyed hashing function, to generate a MAC or hashed-based MAC (HMAC) which is
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then sent back to the server. The server performs the same hash function to generate the
MAC/HMAC and compares it to the received message. If they are both the same, the user
has the correct password that was sent to the server in a secure fashion.
These primitive authentication protocols are insecure by today’s standards. For
this reason, other advanced forms of authentication protocols have been developed, such
as Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which are embedded into different
cryptographic communication protocols such as Secure Shell (SSH), Transport Layer
Security (TLS), and WiFi-Protected Access (WPA). EAP is an authentication framework
that provides many different authentication methods for different communication
protocols. Additionally, EAP may be used on many different communication layers of the
OSI model, whether they be the data link layer using network switches, the network layer
using routers for a LAN, the transport layer over the internet using TCP/IP, or any of the
other further abstracted layers. EAP provides different forms of authentication for wired
and wireless communications from the client to a network device such as a router, and
then finally to the server. EAP supports MAC or message digests authentication such as
CHAP, certificate-based authentication methods such as TLS which require secure
certificates to be installed on the client, or even OTP authentication methods. Figure 2.5
depicts the authentication and establishment of secure communication channels between
a peer and a server via the utilization of EAP Pre-Shared Key (PSK). Both the peer and
the server have a PSK, which they use to create MACs from randomly generated
numbers which are used to authenticate each other, and subsequently establish a secure
communication channel.
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Whatever the method taken, it is important to consider and weigh all the
authentication options for an ICS facility since the facility combines many different
systems together via network connections and different communication protocols.

Figure 2.5

EAP - Pre-Shared Key

Authorization
Once the requesting client or incoming data has been authenticated, the process of
authorization and access control may begin. Authorization and access control are the
process of determining whether the authenticated client or data may gain access or
complete transmission to an endpoint within the ICS. Certain clients and sources of data
are not authorized to reach different endpoints in an ICS to reduce the overall risk
associated with that endpoint. If the endpoint is a controller in a critical application,
limited access is also critical. By doing this, attackers who have managed to gather low
access credentials cannot have access to critical resources. By limiting access to all
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endpoints within an ICS, a stronger security posture may be achieved, and risk associated
with attacks from within may also be mitigated [5, 9, 13].
Secure Communication Protocols
As mentioned previously, data integrity and authentication are crucial parts of
securing clients and data on the ICS network. In addition to these two cornerstones of
secure communications, data confidentiality is the final cornerstone. All three of these
cornerstones can be achieved by utilizing the many different secure communication
protocols used in the field of cybersecurity today.
A key aspect of secure communications is choosing the right secure
communication protocols for given applications. Some forms of communication are
duplex, some simplex, and others using some form of broadcasting to multiple clients.
Securing communications involves many different components that aid in authentication,
encryption, and data integrity. To be able to authenticate and encrypt data, some form of
cryptographic key is needed, whether symmetric, asymmetric, public, or private. In
addition to normal communications, there might be the need to create and distribute
public-private key pairs in a secure way. All these capabilities may be achieved by
utilizing one or many different secure communication protocols. As with most features of
cybersecurity, there is a performance tradeoff due to the computational overhead of
cryptographic calculations. This can be a challenge in ICS environments where data
transfer is time sensitive, and a balance is usually found somewhere in the middle.
Computer network communication is a layered approach, consisting of seven
different layers referred to as the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model. The seven
layers of this model are network traffic abstractions starting from physical hardware and
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building up into applications and their interface to a network. The seven layers are the
physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, and application layers. The
physical layer is the hardware layer where information is passed via some physical
media. The data link layer is where physical addressing, such as MAC addressing,
occurs. The network layer is where routing between computers on a LAN occurs via IP
addresses. The transport layer is where communication between LAN networks occur
forming wide area networks (WAN) via transport protocols such as TCP/IP. The session
layer is where computer hosts establish communication sessions with endpoints on a
network. The presentation layer is data encoding/decoding, encryption/decryption, and
compression/decompression occur. Lastly, the application layer is where applications
interface with the network via the other six layers. This section will be covering
communication protocols associated with different layers of the OSI model.
When considering the layered model of networking, it is important to note that
higher abstracted layers cannot control what takes place in lower layers. For example, the
transport layer cannot affect or secure communications at the data link layer. Due to this,
transport layer security mechanisms would have no effect on an attack that took place at
the data link layer. For this reason, secure communication protocols have been introduced
at nearly every layer of the OSI model to employ a layered security approach in tandem
with a layered networking model.
IEEE 802.1X
One of the most common forms of network security across all networks is data
link layer security. This type of security occurs between hosts on a local area network.
Since data link layer security is implemented on the networking hardware, it is the lowest
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possible level of network security achievable. One implementation of this is IEEE
802.1X, which is a data link layer access control protocol. This protocol uses EAP to
provide authentication mechanisms between physical hosts on a LAN. The protocol
works for both LAN and wireless LAN (WLAN) connections on a network. The protocol
offers optional data encryption. Data encryption does not often occur on the data link
layer as it causes intense overhead on networking hardware, so encryption occurs on
layers higher up on the OSI model.
IPSec
By itself, internet protocol (IP), which exists at the network layer, does not
provide any security features, and was built for the raw functionality of transmitting
information between networks. If a third party were to intercept the packet, they could
retrieve critical information from the raw data, modify the data, or replay the data again
later. To avoid this, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) was developed by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1998 [4]. IPSec is a secure network layer security
framework which encapsulates two protocols called Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP). These two protocols perform authentication to
verify authenticity and integrity of the data received and performs encryption to keep data
confidential. IPSec is frequently used in many different network settings, whether
network to network, host to host, or network to host, and is frequently used in
establishing virtual private networks (VPNs) [4]. Additionally, IPSec has some features
built into it that protect communications against replay attacks so that confidential data
cannot be intercepted and sent multiple times to replay the same message.
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TLS
When communicating simple data or commands between servers and clients, a
widely used communication protocol used to achieve this is known as Transport Layer
Security (TLS). Originally known as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), TLS was derived to
secure TCP/IP communications over transport layer network communications. As
suggested by the name, TLS is an example of a transport layer security protocol. TLS
seeks to achieve confidentiality and authenticity in communications to prevent
eavesdropping or tampering [16]. This is done by the utilization of public asymmetric key
exchange to establish a private key configuration used in encryption and authentication.
TLS is highly configurable and can use many different public key exchange methods for
the establishing of a session, and many different private key encryption methods for the
secure communication across networks.
Figure 2.6 depicts the typical TLS connection handshaking sequence. The client
requests a connection to a server in which cryptographic details about the client are
exchanged. The server then sends its public certificate, and the cipher suite is utilized.
The client then authenticates and verifies the server certificate. The client then sends its
own public certificate along with its private key. Once both the client and server are
finished verifying, a secure and authenticated communication channel is established in
which all messages are encrypted and authenticated.
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Figure 2.6

TLS Handshake

SSH
In an ICS, there may arise the need for embedded systems and computers to
communicate with one another for the access of a terminal, file transfers, or applicationlevel transmission. This brings up grave security concerns because if these connections
were to be intercepted and compromised, the control of the entire system could be at risk.
To avoid this, Secure Shell (SSH) was developed in 1995 to protect against these types of
attacks. SSH is an application layer security protocol that is used for remote system
logins, command executions, and file transfers. Instead of sending login credentials,
commands, and files over the network in plaintext, all information sent and received is
encrypted, decrypted, and authenticated. This is achieved over TCP/IP protocol which
handles the initial public asymmetric key exchange and sets up the symmetric key
encryption and authentication configurations. This process is repeated periodically to
keep keys fresh and brute force resistant. Once this has been established, all further
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information is encrypted, decrypted, and authenticated using the symmetric key to
prevent man-in-the-middle and brute force attacks.
HTTPS
If there is ever a need to communicate with websites hosted on the internet,
security is a huge concern because all communications are now leaving the ICS and
entering the wild west of the internet. However, while this should be avoided in most
cases, there are many different methods to securing internet communications. The most
widely used secure internet communication protocol is known as Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Secure (HTTPS). HTTPS is an example of an application layer security protocol
with which internet applications communicate. This is desirable for an ICS that is
controlled and governed by a central control facility that does not exist on the local ICS
network. HTTPS is secured by TLS, meaning the establishing of secure communications,
encryption, and authentication are handled by TLS in the transport layer, and then
presented to the application layer by HTTPS at endpoints of networks.
Intrusion Detection Systems
While protecting the communications and access into ICS technologies is of
extreme importance, it cannot be the only solution to protecting the system. Since
cybersecurity is a constant game of cat vs. mouse, the capabilities of industries and
attackers alike are becoming more sophisticated. To keep up with this game of cat vs.
mouse, it is obviously important to keep ICS security protocols and policies up to date. It
is also important to realize that ICS are never completely invulnerable to attacks and
intrusions. Extreme efforts have been made toward identifying abnormalities in network
communications and ICS behavior to detect intrusions when they are occurring, or if they
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have already happened. These systems are typically known as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs). These systems scan network traffic and internal system functions to
detect and prevent intrusions. Intrusion detection systems on the network side of an ICS
are known as Network-based IDS (NIDS) [8, 12, 14, 18]. Intrusion detection systems that
work on computers to scan system calls and resources are known as Host-based IDS
(HIDS) [8, 12, 14].
IDS Overview
For intrusion detection systems, there are two dimensions in which they are
classified. The first dimension is the medium in which the IDSs are implemented. The
second dimension is via the strategic implementation of intrusion detection. Within the
first dimension, IDSs are implemented on computer networks and computer hosts to form
network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based intrusion detection
systems (HIDS). The second dimension divides IDSs in terms of their implementation, in
which there are signature-based IDSs and anomaly-based IDSs [8]. In signature based
IDSs, sets of governing security policies are applied to all network traffic or system
function calls to log all behavior of users inside of the governed systems. If these users
breach the security policies based off known attack patterns, the activity is halted, and
system administrators are notified of the activity [18]. In anomaly based IDSs, the system
also scans and logs all network traffic and system function calls and usually, but not
always, employs some form of artificial intelligence or machine learning to detect
anomalies in the behaviors of certain network connections or users on the system [2]. If
these behaviors stray too far from a deemed normal behavior, the activity is labeled as
anomalous and activity is halted, and system administrators are notified. While there are
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distinct differences in the different methods of intrusion detection, these systems can be
integrated into a single IDS for more coverage [20].
While traditional firewalls solutions can prevent most unwanted network traffic
into an ICS, it does not block all traffic as attackers have found many ways to get around
IDSs. IDSs are a great compliment to the overall security of an ICS as they provide
additional layers of protection and security policy governance. However, it is much more
difficult to achieve such a task in an ICS environment [2, 12]. ICSs have more tailored
needs due to the nature of the critical tasks being performed on site. Because ICS are
controlling critical and sometimes destructive processes, it is vital that any IDSs
employed by the ICS should be real-time and have the capability to detect intrusions as
they occur to prevent any damage or loss of information from occurring. Additionally,
since many of the devices running in an ICS are embedded devices, there are limited
computational resources available to perform IDS measures, and therefore must be made
lightweight on top of rigorous. Since ICS have a myriad of legacy hardware and software
technologies, they are weaker to attacks, harder to update, can break easier, and are
operated by insecure protocols. Due to these flaws of the legacy nature of ICSs, it is of
utmost importance to have highly configurable or tailored IDSs that are capable of
melding into current technologies and are capable of protecting older technologies.
Lastly, since ICS IDSs exist at the lowest level of the control hierarchy, it is more
difficult to employ a system with proper visibility to the physical control signals [2].
There are many different IDSs in existence today and choosing the right IDS is
critical to securing relevant systems depending on the application. Some IDSs are very
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focused on one type of detection, while others attempt to fill the role of “jack of all
trades”.
Zeek
One of the more widely used IDSs in existence today is known as Zeek, which
has recently changed its name from Bro. Zeek is an open-source IDS that runs on Linux
OS. It specializes in sniffing and analyzing network traffic, classifying it as a NIDS.
However, it does not focus on just one type of intrusion detection scheme, as it is able to
employ both signature and anomaly-based detection techniques. Zeek, once deployed
onto a computer system or network server, can perform both offline and online analysis
of network traffic and is capable of being scaled out to very large or simple at home
networks, making it a perfect candidate for industrial applications. Zeek employs logging
of all activity of network traffic for analysis or network administrator forensics and
supports analysis on many different application layer protocols including File Transfer
Protocol (FTP), Domain Name System (DNS), HTTPS, TLS, and SSH. Above and
beyond scanning the protocols, Zeek has the capability of analyzing all file contents
introduced into the system via cryptographic hash computation for fingerprinting. In
addition to all these features, it has a lot of documentation and support for integrating into
whichever application you are seeking to protect.
Figure 2.7 depicts a NIDS and where it fits into a layout of a secured network.
Normally, the NIDS sits on the front-facing side of a network and scans all incoming and
outgoing traffic for signature and anomaly-based intrusions. When an intrusion sets off
any configured rules, an alert is generated for security administrators to review, and if
necessary, sever any connections with a potentially malicious source.
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Figure 2.7

Network-Based IDS

Snort
Many open-source intrusion detection systems are combinations of smaller opensource engines tailored to accomplish specific tasks. Snort is one of these smaller IDS
engines used for packet sniffing. Snort is a NIDS that excels at sniffing network traffic
and performing analysis and packet logging. Snort can be configured in three different
modes, Sniffer mode, Packet Logger mode, and NIDS mode. Sniffer mode reads network
packets and displays them to the user, while Packet Logger mode logs the packets to disk.
In NIDS mode, Snort will monitor and analyze network traffic based on a rule set defined
by the network administrator. Based on the rules, different actions are taken depending
on what threat has been identified. In NIDS mode, signature-based, protocol-based, and
anomaly-based analysis is performed on traffic coming into or leaving the network.
Custom rules can be configured by administrators to aid in traffic analysis and search for
specific patterns their adversary may use. This is particularly useful for ICS security
because very specific information should be moving between endpoints on a network,
and Snort allows for alerts or actions to be taken when one of these facility custom rules
has been breached.
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OSSEC
In addition to integrating NIDS to protect networks, it is also vital to protect host
systems and applications with some form of HIDS. OSSEC is a widely used HIDS that is
open source and is compatible with many platforms. OSSEC is a HIDS comprised of
configurable components. OSSEC is managed from a central server inside the host
machine that can monitor agents which could be small programs or collections of
multiple programs running on the host. OSSEC monitors many different aspects of the
agents, such as their function calls to system functions, resource utilization, or
interactions with other processes. OSSEC also intercepts network traffic moving to and
from the host. System calls, resource utilization, network traffic, and inter-process
communications between agents on the host are logged into a central database to be
analyzed.
In addition to the monitoring of agents on the system, OSSEC can be configured
to periodically inspect files that agents are interacting with via a data integrity checking
process known as Syscheck. OSSEC also has the capability of scanning the host system
for any presence of a rootkit using a process called Rootcheck. A rootkit is a collection of
computer software designed to run silently on a computer and slowly cause damage
and/or leak information from a system. Using all the collected information, OSSEC
generates alerts via administrator-tailored rules and policies and helps to efficiently
police a system to detect and stop unwanted process behavior.
Figure 2.8 depicts a HIDS and where it fits into the scope of a computer host
system. The HIDS, like the NIDS, scans all communications going into and out of the
host. Additionally, the HIDS scans processes running on the host and ensures that inter-
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process communications are not performing system calls they should not be or partaking
in any anomalous behavior. If so, the HIDS reports the behavior to a system administrator
who can in turn tell the host to shut down the potentially malicious processes or external
connections to the host.

Figure 2.8

Host-Based IDS

Security Onion
IDSs come in many flavors and configurations. It can be difficult for security
teams to set up and integrate the features of many different IDSs. In this circumstance, it
may be desirable for security teams to adopt an IDS security suite which houses and
integrates many different IDSs. One example of an IDS security suite used for protecting
an entire network is known as Security Onion, a Linux-based OS security platform.
Instead of installing and configuring each security tool one by one, Security Onion offers
different IDS security components that can be enabled, configured, and integrated
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together seamlessly. Security Onion’s tools have the capability to analyze all the network
traffic moving on the network it is attached to. Security Onions can analyze the traffic for
intrusions, generate security alerts, perform corrective actions in response to alerts, and
log all actions into a database to profile each network endpoint. Security Onion offers a
couple NIDS to sniff all traffic moving onto the network to which it is attached, such as
Zeek and Snort. Additionally, Security Onion offers analyst tools that can be used by
network administrators to view the profiles of connections, network packets, transmitted
files, etc. Security Onion also can serve as a central point of communication for HIDS
running on each host on the network. Using HIDS such as OSSEC, alerts and logs can be
stored and sent to the central Security Onion server to alert system administrators of
suspicious behavior or intrusions occurring on hosts connected to the network.
Network Enclave
As seen in the section titled Typical ICS Facility Structure, each of the different
regions of the industrial control facility have isolated enterprise, supervisory, and field
networks. These network subregions are known as network enclaves. Network enclaves
are meant to restrict access to certain portions of the network to increase security and
reduce traffic on the same network channels. Each of these network enclaves have
different functional purposes and connectivity requirements. Network enclaves allow for
the separation of network resources and tailoring of what connectivity they have to the
rest of the facility [9, 13].
Network enclaves also allow for network resources to be distributed without any
interaction to unrelated enclaves. This improves network performance as network traffic
is distributed along branches of the network as opposed to all traffic moving through a
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main branch. As described in the section titled Removal of Unnecessary Resources, the
removal of unnecessary resources is critical to reducing the attack surface of the system
being protected. By removing unnecessary connectivity via network enclaves, the attack
surface is reduced because attackers do not have as much facility to move laterally within
a large spanning network [9, 13]. Since the network traffic is distributed, attackers also
do not have the capability to listen to all traffic moving on the network, and only within
the enclave to which they have access.
While the large network enclaves have DMZs between them, such as the
enterprise layer and the supervisory layer, the network can be further divided into smaller
network enclave subregions within each of these larger layers. For example, the
management layer may have an accounting division, a resource planning division, a
marketing division, etc. Figure 2.9 depicts an example of a network enclave structure in
an ICS environment.
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Figure 2.9

ICS Network Enclave

Threat Modeling & Intelligence
Due to the nearly infinite possible attack vectors known and unknown, the real
challenge to ICS security is knowing where to apply these security protections in a way
that makes a difference. Without any knowledge of what the attack surface looks like,
implementing secure communication protocols or integrating an IDS into a network may
result in nothing at all. Only by understanding the attack surface and threats to an ICS,
can protections be applied and make a difference. By bringing all the security elements
together, ICS network administrators are left with an abundance of tools and information,
but perhaps lack the knowledge and/or perspective of how to assemble, configure, and
maintain the security system. Security teams may be left without somewhere to build an
understanding of their attack surface, and subsequently the forming of a fortified security
posture.
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However, there are many tools that have been developed for enterprise, corporate,
and industrial environments to combat against small, or potentially very large threats
such as APTs. Some of these tools might seem very intimidating to a smaller ICS facility
comprised of a few individuals, without a network team, who are responsible for securing
the facility to protect investments and intellectual property. An organization that does a
phenomenal job at distilling this information is known as the MITRE Corporation. The
MITRE ATT&CK Framework is an organized database that provides threat modeling,
detection, and mitigation capabilities for many different industries. The framework
details common APTs, their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The framework
also details methods of detecting and mitigating the impact these TTPs have in the event
of an attack. ATPs and their TTPs have been recorded and publicly posted so that the
world can learn from their actions, and how to protect against them in the future. With an
abundance of threats, attacks, and databases of logged attacker behavior, the MITRE
ATT&CK Framework presents all the information necessary for the protection of ICSs
with smaller network teams to large ICS facilities with large and sophisticated network
teams dedicated to attack, analysis, and defense [15].
MITRE ATT&CK Framework
The MITRE ATT&CK Framework was created in 2013 as an open-source tool to
document attacker tactics and methodologies, whether small or large. The Framework
offers a large database of 12 different tactics that ATPs perform to infiltrate networks and
perform actions once on the network [15]. The framework categorizes the tactics into 12
categories:
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1. Initial Access

– getting into a network

2. Execution

– running malicious code

3. Persistence

– maintaining a foothold

4. Privilege Escalation

– attaining higher level permissions

5. Defense Evasion

– avoiding detection

6. Credential Access

– stealing account names and passwords

7. Discovery

– understanding the environment

8. Lateral Movement

– moving within the environment

9. Collection

– gathering data of interest to meet their goal

10. Command and Control

– communicating with/controlling compromised systems

11. Exfiltration

– stealing critical data

12. Impact

– manipulating/interrupting/destroying systems and data

Within the MITRE ATT&CK Database, there are a plethora of attack methods
within each category. Each type of industry, whether medical, industrial, or corporate,
has APTs that persistently attack them. Within each industry, the 12 categories contain
the TTPs used by ATPs and suggestions for mitigation techniques are made. With this
information, building an attack surface for the desired application becomes streamlined.
With tools such as their ATT&CK Navigator, a categorical matrix representation of an
attack surface can be visualized [15]. The levels of risk and security capability associated
with each threat can be used to generate heat maps of the attack surface to depict where
weaknesses lie. Figure 2.10 [28] depicts an example of a generated heat map.
There are four key uses cases that the framework offers in building a holistic
defense system [15]. The four main use cases of the Framework are:
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1. Threat Intelligence – what threats and methodologies are present for the
application
2. Detection and Analysis – how to build detections and analysis tools for known
threats
3. Emulation – how to mimic known threats to increase extensiveness of
detection
4. Assessments – how to measure defenses and enable improvements in the
future

Figure 2.10

ATT&CK Navigator Heat Map
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Threat Intelligence
Applying defenses for every type of threat or attack can be time consuming for an
organization, especially those with large amounts of resources such as an ICS facility. In
addition to the time required to address every type of threat, designing IDSs with rules
and policies for every single existing threat will result in a slow security system. If an
IDS applies each rule/policy for all network traffic, the system will be slow, inefficient,
and incapable of monitoring all traffic. For this reason, the ATT&CK Framework is well
suited for any organization who wants to employ a threat-informed defense where they
approach their defensive posture from a pragmatic and well-informed point of view. The
ATT&CK Framework enables organizations of any size to build their security tools
around threat intelligence on relevant threats and their TTPs [15].
Within the ATT&CK database, queries can be made into specific industries and
their systems to build an attack surface based on the recorded TTPs of ATPs in that area.
In the case of ICSs, MITRE has an entire website dedicated to threat intelligence for
ICSs. From their website you can view the relevant APTs and the TTPs they have
employed against ICS facilities worldwide.
Detection & Analysis
After performing threat intelligence, the next step is to choose and configure the
IDSs in a facility network. Each system has its own configuration techniques and
understanding the syntax and approaches of TTPs is necessary in putting up the detection
mechanisms. There are many different open-source databases with the internet registries
of these attacks to be studied and understood. MITRE themselves has their own
ATT&CK Framework database for all submitted attacks under their recognized APTs.
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Using this information, custom rules and policies can be applied to the IDSs within an
organization [15].
In addition to configuring IDSs, MITRE offers suggestions on other types of
detection and mitigation techniques for each TTP. For example, in the category of
Impact, there exists the known technique of Firmware Corruption. The framework offers
resources on how this has been performed and offers the detection mechanism of logging
and monitoring all attempts to read/write to the BIOS. Within this TTP, there are three
different mitigation techniques suggested: Boot Integrity, Privileged Account
Management, and Software Updates.
For each relevant category, the framework can be utilized to gather detection and
mitigation techniques to build up the security mechanisms of an organization. With this
information, organizations may begin to configure rules that define the behavior of their
IDSs and form mitigation techniques to protect against the ATPs that exist in their
industry. Once protections have been put in place, the IDSs and mitigation techniques can
be developed further by red teams and blue teams within the organization [15]. Over
time, a strong and holistic security posture can be formed.
Emulation
While ATPs behavior is documented and strong detection and mitigation
techniques can be formed, ATPs are sophisticated and adaptive. ATPs often form new
tactics to circumnavigate protections put in place to ward against their previous efforts.
For this reason, it is important to get in the mind of an adversary and attempt to emulate
their types of attacks. Red teams and blue teams can attempt to breach and defend their
organizations systems to test the comprehensiveness of defenses and expose any
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weaknesses. Without emulation, it is difficult to determine whether the detection and
mitigation techniques are effective.
While it is much more difficult to cover a lot of different emulations in a single
organization, there exist tools to help the automation process of adversary emulation. An
example of emulation tools that map well into the ATT&CK Framework is known as
Atomic Red Team. It offers different tests which can execute automated attacks against
an organization’s network to test the effectiveness of detection and mitigation techniques
put in place. While they only focus on a singular attack technique, hence the name
atomic, these tests are set up in such a way that they can be tested in sequence cover a
wider area. Over time, network security teams can expand their covered attack surface
greatly by taking a targeted approach towards emulating different attack techniques made
by the APTs that are the biggest threats to their organization [15].
Assessments
The final major use case for the MITRE ATT&CK Framework is utilizing the
framework to assess on an organization’s security posture. By doing an assessment on
defenses, one may find areas that are lacking in security and make improvements.
Assessments, like any of the other use cases for the Framework, can be utilized by any
size of organization seeking to bolster security defenses. MITRE suggests assessments be
taken in 3 incremental steps:
1. Assess the coverage of defenses using the ATT&CK Navigator
2. Identify the most vital gaps that exist in defense coverage
3. Modify defenses to fill those security gaps
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This process of repeated threat intelligence gathering and assessment should be
periodically repeated because the capabilities of attackers are always evolving and
growing stronger, and so should an organization’s defenses. By doing this, a heat map
can be updated frequently to show improvements, and where general weaknesses lie in an
organization’s security coverage. Once coverage has been assessed, organizations can
begin creating priorities for implementing change [15]. Now that the organization knows
where change should be implemented, detection and mitigation techniques can be
created, and the cycle continues.
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CHAPTER 3: RESILIENT ICS DATA
To understand how this thesis fits in relation to ICS security, a larger perspective
is required. Several concepts form the foundation of this thesis: system functions and
interactions, adversaries and threats to industrial control, the thought process of
adversaries, and modern ICS security practices. Each of these elements come together to
form a more complete view of ICS system security, cyber resiliency, system/data-level
resiliency, and how each can be addressed. This chapter proposes a data acquisition
system with the main purpose of increasing resiliency, including cyber, system, and data.
Trust and vulnerability are common struggles for modern ICS security engineers.
Vetting data for trustworthiness is critical, as illegitimate data may be presented to
IDS/IPSs by adversaries or because of degrading devices. Perhaps an ATP has
compromised equipment in the field that is responsible for reporting information to an
IDS. This device could be a PLC with corrupted firmware, or a compromised or a
physically degraded or broken sensor or actuator. Anything that can report false
information may cause cascading side effects for functionality and system security. This
thesis seeks to provide a relevant solution to the pervasive issue of false information
within the control hierarchy.
There are other avenues of research that align with what this thesis proposes [24].
One such avenue is the application of additive layer manufacturing (ALM), where circuit
features and functionality are applied on top of one another, rather than the typical
subtractive silicon approaches. However, circuit modifications via 3D printing
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technologies run the risk of adversarial interference. In the case where an adversary has
compromised an ALM control system, the adversary may have the ability to change
circuit topology and behavior. This is accomplished by interfering with the control
process, leading to cascading security concerns post-manufacturing. Dawson pursues the
formation of an IDS via an out-of-band data acquisition unit in a test environment [24].
This thesis expands on the research proposed by Dawson et al. [24] by designing and
demonstrating a data acquisition unit compatible with general ICS applications.
The Proposed System
This thesis provides the missing link in modern ICS security systems and attempts
to implement a device that provides increased visibility at the lowest level of the control
hierarchy. This device is a new type of data acquisition unit that may be deployed within
control processes for an out-of-band data channel control process I/O. The proposed
system monitors, records, and verifies control/sensor voltages/currents to verify the
legitimacy of data being reported back from the control system. If any of the control
process components are damaged or compromised, the data may not reflect reality, and
the proposed system addresses these concerns. For example, a damaged sensor may
report inaccurate data, or a compromised PLC may purposefully report false or
misleading data.
To address these issues the proposed data acquisition unit converts the physical
electrical signals of the control process out-of-band from the PLC. It then reports the
information to a network endpoint that contains an IDS/IPS as a form of verification of
in-band control process I/O values. The out-of-band and in-band data can be synthesized
and analyzed by the IDS/IPS to build trust in ICS data sources. If there are any
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discrepancies in the data being collected, then the sources may be degrading, damaged, or
compromised. The IDS may alert security and system engineers to shut down systems
and address the discrepancy. Figure 3.1 depicts the proposed data acquisition system and
how it fits into the ICS model.
One application of this data acquisition system may have been of benefit during
the devastating ICS data subversion attack, Stuxnet. Compromised firmware within the
PLCs were forcing Iranian centrifuges to accelerate but were reporting false RPM back to
servers. If this data acquisition unit were installed at the electrical contacts of a centrifuge
control system, the visibility on the physical state of the system may have enabled an IDS
to detect the attack. By noticing a discrepancy in the data being reported to the IDS, an
alert could have been generated and security engineers could have halted systems before
the severe damage occurred.
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Figure 3.1

Proposed Thesis Contribution

An additional application of this data acquisition system is for verification of
control process data used as training data for machine learning security algorithms. Some
machine learning algorithms are trained to understand normal control process behavior to
detect anomalies. If the systems used for training data are already compromised, the
algorithm will be taught the wrong lessons about reported typical behavior. Incorrect
training would render the AI system incapable of detecting anomalous behavior, causing
security problems in the future. Avoidance of compromised training data can be achieved
by verifying the legitimacy of the data through the cross reference of data acquired by the
proposed system.
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There may be other data science applications for this data acquisition system.
However, the main purpose of this thesis is to propose a new tactic, technique, and
procedure for detecting anomalous or illegitimate data due to system degradation and
infiltration. In chapters 6 and 7, the electrical hardware and software design will be
discussed further to demonstrate how such a system is created, tested, and integrated into
modern ICS security systems.
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CHAPTER 4: CYBER RESILIENCY IN SYSTEMS & DATA
Through observation of current security practices implemented in ICS facilities, it
is clear there is an extensive variety of cybersecurity technologies to thwart the efforts of
adversaries. All the protections are put in place to secure something within the ICS
facility whether it be credentials, intellectual property, or physical systems. In any case,
security engineers must fully understand the systems they are attempting to fortify as well
as the attack surfaces that exist. Much study, effort, and priority has been put into
securing and fortifying existing IT systems in an effort to prevent attackers from getting
into ICS networks initially. However, because of cases like Stuxnet where attackers have
managed to infiltrate a network, detecting the adversary, and protecting internal systems
becomes more difficult. This is an overarching relationship present between attackers and
defenders of ICS networks; with each new successful attack, stronger and more resilient
defenses must be devised.
For this reason, there can never be a completely fortified ICS network, and it must
be assumed that IT and OT systems are always at risk. The perceived attack surface
might be covered, but the growing interconnectedness of IT/OT systems always provides
opportunities for attackers to seep through the cracks. This chapter discusses
cybersecurity elements at a high level to exfoliate issues found within modern ICS
security systems. To begin, system thinking is used in threat intelligence considerations
and will be expounded upon, revealing its role in proper modern cybersecurity system
implementations [11]. The second portion of this chapter covers concepts of cyber
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resiliency. Next, a discussion on system resiliency reveals broader implications related to
cyber resiliency and modern IT/OT security practices. Finally, this chapter discusses a
lacking element of cyber/system resiliency considerations in ICS security, data resiliency.
System Thinking
In the face of APTs and their relentless crusade against many industries,
cybersecurity personnel must think in terms of systems to have a more complete
understanding of the attack surface of IT/OT systems. One method of inspection which
offers an advantageous perspective of attack surfaces within whole systems is known as
“System Thinking”. System thinking requires a deconstruction of the system design into
its primary components, behavior, and purpose. When a system is broken down into its
fundamental elements, understanding their relation to the whole system becomes clearer.
This process aids in creating cybersecurity solutions that fit well into the system and do
not increase the attack surface elsewhere. This can be a time-consuming task as complex
systems are generally interconnected, and a complex system can have feedback where the
entire system interacts with itself [11]. Therefore, small changes to systems or security
may cause cascading consequences throughout the rest of the system. For example, a new
functionality may be introduced to an ICS that initially allows the system to perform
better or provide more security. However, unknown consequences may arise due to the
feature’s connections with other components of the system, possibly providing the
attacker a new avenue of entry into the system.
Every technological system has hardware and software components, hardwaredefined and software-defined behaviors, and an overall functionality goal. The
components may consist of processors, transducers, routers, programs, operating systems,
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etc. The behaviors originate from how the software and hardware components are
connected, integrated, or programmed. Components and behaviors come together to
complete the system and to achieve an ultimate outcome whether it be maintaining the
pressure in a tank, calculating credit score, or sending messages across the world.
Every system has an overarching structure which is known as the system
hierarchy; the system may have subsystems, and those systems may have subsystems of
their own [11]. Viewing the system as hierarchical offers an advantageous perspective
over the system when trying to identify and protect the attack surface of a system. This is
especially true because this method of functional decomposition is exactly how ATPs
find vulnerabilities within large and complex systems. Every layer of the hierarchy,
whether it be the main system or the most simple and low-level subsystem, has an attack
vector associated with it. By increasing the complexity, breadth, or depth of the system
hierarchy, more attack vectors are exposed ultimately growing the attack surface.
The process of observing and addressing security at the hierarchical level is
known as “security in depth”. Every piece of the system may offer an avenue for
attackers to enter the system, so it is critical that every layer of the system be addressed
for attack vectors and suitable corresponding security protections [9, 12, 13]. The security
in depth approach addresses a wide range of security concerns, from malware to
educating system operators and users. Chapter 2 describes different types of protections
and security practices for IT/OT computer systems and networks in depth.
Unfortunately, modern ICS practices are often lacking in protection and
verification of the physical systems processes that exist at the lowest level of the control
system hierarchy. The concepts of cyber, system, and data resiliency can address these
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concerns. There are many definitions of resiliency with respect to systems and their
applications. Researchers have often used multiple attributes to encompass what
“resilient” means with respect to the given application. Some sources claim that
resiliency is the ability to rebound back from a failure, while others claim resiliency is the
ability to withstand the forces that cause system failure [1, 5]. For the concept of
resiliency, more definitions provide a broader context and encourage a well-planned
cybersecurity approach.
Cyber Resiliency
A high-level concept of cyber resiliency provides a framework for breaking down
resiliency in the cybersecurity environment. NIST defines cyber resiliency as “the ability
to anticipate, withstand, recover, and adapt from adverse conditions, stress, attacks, or
compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources” [22]. The goals of
cyber resilient systems are the following [22]:
1. Anticipate: Maintain a state of informed preparedness for adversity.
2. Withstand: Continue essential mission or business functions despite
adversity.
3. Recover: Restore mission or business functions during and after adversity.
4. Adapt: Modify mission or business functions and/or supporting
capabilities to predicted changes in the technical, operational, or threat
environments.
Within the context of these goals, here are eight objectives listed by NIST that aid
in the forming of cyber resilient systems, and they are the following [22]:
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1. Prevent: Preclude the successful execution of an attack or the realization of
adverse conditions.
2. Prepare: Maintain a set of realistic courses of action that address predicted or
anticipated adversity.
3. Continue: Maximize the duration and viability of essential mission or business
functions during adversity.
4. Constrain: Limit damage from adversity.
5. Reconstitute: Restore as much mission or business functionality as possible after
adversity.
6. Understand: Maintain useful representations of mission and business
dependencies and the status of resources with respect to possible adversity.
7. Transform: Modify mission or business functions and supporting processes to
handle adversity and address environmental changes more effectively.
8. Re-Architect: Modify architectures to handle adversity and address environmental
changes more effectively.
Within these definitions are a few objectives that pertain to the proposed data
acquisition system introduced in Chapter 3. First and foremost, the data acquisition
system’s main goal is to aid in the prevention (1) and constraining (4) of adversity via
degradation and infiltration of ICS OT. Prevention and constraining of adversity are
achieved through an understanding (6) of system level signals through increased visibility
of the electrical behavior of ICS processes. This understanding, achieved through
increased visibility, stems from the re-architecture (8) of the ICS environment. This re-
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architecture is what this thesis proposes, the integration of an out-of-band data acquisition
system at the control process level.
The specific implementation of cyber resiliency differs between applications, and
along with the defined objectives NIST additionally lists techniques that can be
interpreted and applied. The listed techniques in [22] are Adaptive Response, Analytic
Monitoring, Contextual Awareness, Coordinated Protection, Deception, Diversity,
Dynamic Positioning, Non-Persistence, Privilege Restriction, Realignment, Redundancy,
Segmentation, Substantiated Integrity, and Unpredictability [22].
The cyber resiliency techniques that apply to the data acquisition system are the
following [22]:
1. Analytic Monitoring: Monitor and analyze a wide range of properties and
behaviors on an ongoing basis and in a coordinated way.
2. Contextual Awareness: Construct and maintain current representations of
the posture of missions or business functions considering threat events and
courses of action.
3. Substantiated Integrity: Ascertain whether critical system elements have
been corrupted.
These three techniques apply directly to the proposed data acquisition system. The
data acquisition system can be integrated into existing ICS analytic monitoring systems
such as IDSs, widening the range of system signal inputs. In addition to widening the
range of inputs, the data acquisition system provides out-of-band data channels which
give both contextual awareness and increased visibility to the electrical behavior of
control processes. By integrating the data acquisition system into existing analytic
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monitoring systems, and gaining increased contextual awareness via increased visibility,
a greater level of data integrity can be achieved. By comparing in-band and out-of-band
channels of ICS data, discrepancies may point to degraded or corrupted system
components.
System Resiliency
In the context of ICSs, a framework known as the R4 framework of resilience
provides description of what resiliency is in the context of systems [3]. The four
attributes listed are robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity.
1. Robustness: the ability of systems, system elements, and other units of
analysis to withstand disaster forces without significant degradation or loss of
performance
2. Redundancy: the extent to which subsystems, system elements, or other units
are sustainable, that is, capable of satisfying functional requirements, if
significant degradation or loss of functionality occurs
3. Resourcefulness: the ability to diagnose and prioritize problems and to initiate
solutions by identifying and mobilizing material, monetary, informational,
technological, and human resources
4. Rapidity: the capacity to restore functionality in a timely way, containing
losses and avoiding disruptions
The R4 framework tends to be thoroughly implemented in IT environments.
Robustness is achieved via the implementation of systems which employ authentication
and authorization to ensure system resources are given to entrusted users. Those systems
also ensure a network enclave that separates and isolates network regions and provides
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data integrity methods to ensure the transmission and storage of untampered data.
Redundancy is achieved via backup servers and hosts which maintain service in the event
of system crashes, and through storage of redundant data as backups. Resourcefulness is
achieved via the implementation of intrusion detection systems which can analyze
network traffic for bad actors and allow network administrators to shut down or deploy
resources when problems arise. As a result of proper implementation of the first three
attributes, rapidity can be achieved by network administrators, allowing timely isolation
where problems arise and containing the problem locally to avoid cascading problems
throughout the facility.
Data Resiliency
IDSs and mitigation systems are implemented through many different means to
meet the diverse demands of infrastructure. Some examples previously mentioned
include the monitoring of network and host behavior, reduction of access, cryptographic
methods, etc. However, the same considerations cannot be directly applied to OT where
physical processes take place. In typical ICS security applications, emphasis has been
placed on the fortification of systems in IT and the availability of OT information [5]. As
a result, there is less focus on OT security and OT system/data resiliency. However, if an
attacker has already infiltrated both IT and OT systems in examples such as Stuxnet, it
becomes difficult to detect an attack due to compounding data subversion and
obfuscation techniques [7, 10]. These types of attacks successfully obfuscate the reality
of what is happening in the physical domain of systems.
For modern ICS environments, the system and its operation are only as resilient as
the data they use. From the IT perspective, the common cybersecurity practices do their
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best to keep transmitted and stored data resilient. However, from the OT perspective,
there is usually trust placed in the data returned from the PLCs. System engineers can
frequently check the integrity of the programs and data within PLCs and may conclude
that these devices are not compromised. Misplaced trust can cause substantial problems,
as in the case of Stuxnet. The malware was stored in a rootkit, where program integrity
checking does not work and therefore the data cannot be trusted. For this reason, it is
important to apply the R4 framework to OT in the same capacity as IT [3].
Of the four attributes to the R4 framework, redundancy is scarce in modern OT
security practices. Significant trust is placed in field devices, which may have already
been compromised and may be returning illegitimate data. Unfortunately, PLCs may be
infected, or sensors and actuators may be compromised unknowingly during
manufacturing by a third-party. This also feeds directly into the issue of contextual
awareness deficiencies described in [22]. Without context of the data being received, a
complete picture of the behavior of ICS OT cannot be formed.
To regain trust lost by incomplete visibility in ICS field devices, a new method
must be devised which can address the areas of deficiency. This thesis proposes a new
type of out-of-band ICS data acquisition system that aids in the verification of in-band
data being processed by control system and security technology. The data acquisition
system is designed to offer increased control process visibility via an additional
perspective on the physical processes being controlled. This additional data can be used
to verify the legitimacy of ICS data and build trust with the data sources in the ICS
environment. Without any visibility of ICS data available to check on the physical
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environment, data subversion and data poisoning attacks will remain a large threat to the
protection and operation of the systems which are the life and blood of ICS facilities.
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
To demonstrate the proposed data acquisition system, an example design was
created, assembled, and integrated into an existing control system. The acquisition unit
was tapped into the example design’s electrical signals to gather, record, and monitor the
behavior of the system. This chapter will cover the layout of the example design, some
system failures due to degradation or infiltration, the layout of the data acquisition
system, and the integration of the data acquisition system into the control system.
Example Design
For this thesis, a simple four-tank water flow control system was utilized to
demonstrate the capabilities of a data acquisition system. For the purposes of
demonstration, only one of the four tanks was used. Figure 5.1 is a diagram of the water
tank control system. The system actuator is a water valve which controls the flow rate of
water into a water tank. The system sensor is a pressure sensor that returns the water
pressure inside the tank back to the PLC. The water valve is controlled by the PLC and
opens or closes the water valve to control the flow rate of water being poured into the
water tank. The bottom of the water tank has a fixed size drain where water empties into
a reservoir that houses the water pumps. The flow rate out of the drain is proportional to
the water pressure inside of the tank, which is proportional to the water level of the tank.
The PLC firmware was designed to control the level inside of the water tank via the
control feedback loop. The value of water pressure inside of the tank and the desired
water level inside of the tank are used by the PLC to drive the water valve to a position.

72
While the system is simple, it is enough to demonstrate the different types of sensors,
actuators, and control mechanisms that can be monitored for deterioration or
compromised behavior. Figure 5.2 depicts the control loop for the water tank system.

Figure 5.1

Water Tank Control System

The control mechanisms are implemented within the PLC via a proportional,
integral, and derivative (PID) controller. The PID controller accepts the desired tank level
and the current tank pressure as inputs and is responsible for driving the position of the
water valve whether fully closed, fully open, or somewhere in between. By controlling
the water valve position, the PLC also controls the flow rate of water into the tank. The
entire control system is implemented digitally. This means the PID controller is based in
software, and all analog inputs are digitized and stored in the internal PLC register space.
Analog I/O conversion is performed by analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) and digitalto-analog converters (DACs) inside of the PLC.
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Figure 5.2

Water Tank Control Loop

The control system input, the water tank level, was designed to be an oscillating
process in which the water tank level oscillates from 25% to 75% full over the period of
an hour. To get the control system to track this water tank level with reasonable accuracy,
the PID controller underwent a PID tuning process in which the different proportional,
integral, and derivative gains are incrementally adjusted to meet the control system
response requirements. By tuning the gains on the controller, a responsive water tank
system was derived that is capable of closely tracking the desired water tank level. Figure
5.3 depicts the recorded sinusoidal control process over the course of approximately two
hours. This data was recorded via the data acquisition system and depicts the behavior of
the water tank control output responding to the sinusoidal input.
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Figure 5.3

Recorded Control Process

Degradation & Infiltration
In the age of cybersecurity, it can be easy to attribute failures that arise in the
control system environment to the infiltration and attacks of an adversary. While this is
an important concern, there also exists the possibility that the control system is degrading
and breaking down. This section will detail the challenges in identifying and diagnosing
failures when and after they occur and will give perspective into how the proposed data
acquisition system may aid in this effort. With IDSs employed today, degradation and
infiltration have become incredibly difficult to detect once introduced to the system. This
thesis proposes an addition to the lowest level of the control hierarchy within this data
acquisition system. This is done with the goal of offering increased visibility to physical
devices that may be degrading or compromised.
Degradation
Within any control system, there are physical parts that electrically operate and
perform work. In these environments, physical components are prone to degradation.
Degradation may lead to undefined behavior that is difficult to anticipate and identify. If
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a degrading component is not repaired, the system may sustain damages or fail entirely.
The reason identification of degradation is such a challenge for system engineers is
related to how control status signals are reported in the control environment. A PLC
reports digital status information to the control network. Actuators and sensors return
analog status information to the PLC which digitizes it. Due to the transient nature of this
data transfer, if degradation interferes with status reporting anywhere along the chain of
information flow, it may be difficult for system engineers to identify if and where a
problem exists.
Manufacturers tend to perform extensive degradation analysis on their products.
Their findings are generally published in a reliability report or datasheet which details the
common causes of failure and provides a predicted life expectancy of the device. Detailed
in this report are many different statistical figures which combined form a reliability
model. One of the key figures in this report is known as the Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF), which essentially gives the predicted duration of time between failures of a
device. Another key figure is the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). These figures come
together to form the calculation for availability which is defined as:

𝐴𝐴: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴;

𝐴𝐴 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀⁄(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹;

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

Devices are designed so their availability is very close to one but are never

perfect. For example, in Allen Bradley ControlLogix controllers, their anticipated MTBF
is predicted to be at least 1 million hours and is often greater. With an advertised MTTR
of 10 hours, that results in a high availability of 0.99999.
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While devices are designed to have very high availability, these figures are
calculated based on typical operating environments. If any of the devices are operating in
anything outside of a typical environment, the predicted MTBF is going to be smaller,
and failures should be prepared for and anticipated.
Infiltration
If an adversary has compromised any of the devices in the control hierarchy, data
being reported in the chain of information flow may be illegitimate and hiding failures as
an attack is in progress. While the example design is simple and houses a small number
of components, there are still a few attack vectors present.
The first method of infiltration compromises either the firmware or the hardware
of the PLC. The firmware can be altered via a network intrusion into the ICS facility in
which malicious code is introduced to the PLC. Introduced malicious code may give the
adversary control over the device and data reporting, visibility over the control process,
the ability to move laterally on the control network. The PLC may have been
compromised during the manufacturing process or in transit, where an adversary may
have infiltrated the third-party vendor to introduce malicious code and/or hardware
modifications to the PLC.
Once the PLC has been compromised, the adversary may gain complete control
over the device. With complete control, the attacker may force devices to report false
control status information and perform a data subversion attack. A data subversion attack
is a circumstance where false status information is reported while control processes are
driven to unstable operating conditions to cause failures and damage. This type of attack
was performed via the Stuxnet computer worm against the Iranian nuclear program.
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Another type of intrusion would be the introduction of malicious hardware
modifications into the actuators and sensors sold by third-party vendors [25]. If the
attackers were to introduce malicious hardware into the sensors or actuators, then the
adversary might be able to perform a data subversion attack.
System Integration
The addition of a data acquisition system at the physical layer of the control
hierarchy will offer visibility to combat the challenges that device degradation and
compromise introduce. The proposed system is designed to be installed between any PLC
and the sensors/actuators. The data acquisition system converts the electrical I/O signals,
current or voltage, into digital values that are returned to the control network. This
additional out-of-band channel of data can be used as a cross-reference to the in-band
control data being reported via the standard flow of information from the PLC. If a
discrepancy exists in any of the control signal data channels, such as the water valve
position or water tank level, system engineers can halt the process and investigate the
inconsistency before damage occurs.
Chapter 6 details the electrical design of the data acquisition system. The function
of the data acquisition system is to convert arbitrary control I/O signals into an
appropriate range that can be digitized by an ADC. Once digitized, the values can be
retrieved via a serial data interface on a microcontroller.
Control processes are sensitive and designed around a system’s physics, therefore
interfering with the control system’s electrical behavior can be devastating. The proposed
data acquisition system is also designed to have negligible impact on the electrical
behavior via the implementation of a high impedance amplifier circuit. The high
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impedance is designed to stop any control system power from leaking into the data
acquisition system. Additionally, the data acquisition system is designed to be highly
configurable and compatible with different forms of control signals, whether they be
current controlled, voltage controlled, or PWM controlled.
The ADC circuit is the second portion of the data acquisition system. The ADC
circuit is designed to have a microcontroller interface to select and retrieve the digitized
value of an I/O signal. The software running on the microcontroller asserts a signal to
select which control I/O signal it wants to retrieve, and the ADC circuit returns the
specified data. Both the high impedance amplifier circuit and the ADC circuit were
designed and manufactured onto a single printed circuit board (PCB). This PCB can be
mounted onto a microcontroller for easy integration.
The final portion of the data acquisition system is the microcontroller and its
software, which are used to extract real-time I/O data. An example software design was
created to demonstrate the capabilities of the data acquisition hardware. Chapter 7 details
the software design of the hardware device driver and a simple data monitoring system.
The hardware device driver reads the control I/O signal values via a serial interface on
the control tap circuit.
For purposes of demonstration, a simple data monitoring system was
implemented that compares the control tap values with values retrieved from the PLC.
Realistically, the data acquisition from the system and PLC would be transmitted to a
network endpoint containing an IDS to aid in the detection of anomalous behavior. If any
discrepancies are detected, alerts could be generated to halt production and investigate
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the source of the error. Figure 5.4 depicts where the proposed control monitor would fit
into the example control system design.
If any alerts are generated, system administrators and engineers could investigate
the cause and backtrack to determine the cause of the system deviation. This gives the
administrators and engineers an additional point of reference to understand where the
problem lies: whether it is a compromised hardware device and/or program, or simply a
degrading device in the field.

Figure 5.4

Water Tank Control System with Monitor
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CHAPTER 6: HARDWARE DESIGN
Control Tap Overview
Monitoring and tracking of the analog I/O signals from sensors and actuators are
normally performed by the PLC. However, a beneficial feature the control tap circuit
provides is an out-of-band avenue of data at the physical layer of the control hierarchy.
By obtaining the analog signals on an out-of-band channel from the PLC and its network
connection, security administrators have a second point of reference with which to
compare in-band I/O values. This comparison may enable security administrators and
engineers to detect discrepancies between the channels, which could be a sign of system
degradation or infiltration.
To record the analog signals and use them in the digital world, the signals must be
converted from analog to digital values. While this may seem like a trivial task, the
electrical design of the data acquisition unit must not interfere with the control system.
This chapter describes the design process of the data acquisition circuitry that produces a
digital value which can be utilized by data scientists and security teams. The electrical
design consists of a few amplifier circuits that condition the control I/O electrical signals
within a range of voltages that can be converted to a digital value by an ADC. Each
amplifier circuit will contain different electrical and amplification stages. The electrical
and amplification stages are linked in series and the final amplification stage is presented
to the input terminal of an ADC. All amplification stages, ADCs, and power supplies
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come together to form an amplifier sensor circuit. The flow of information from ICS
control I/O to out-of-band data is presented in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1

Amplifier Sensor Circuit Block Diagram

One challenge in the design of the amplifier circuitry is preventing electrical
interference with the physical control process. Each of the actuators and sensors send and
receive electrical signals to perform the control and command of the physical process. If
these electrical signals are modified in transit to their destinations, then the control
process will be disrupted. Control processes are designed around the physics of the
control system and must not change how the system electrically behaves. To prevent this,
the amplifier circuits were designed to have high input impedance. By doing so,
negligible current (and subsequently power) leaks into the control tap circuit.
Amplifier Sensor Circuits
There are a few different amplifier circuits that may be required, depending on the
type of electrical I/O signals utilized by the control system application. A control system
may have current controlled, voltage controlled, or pulse-width modulation (PWM)
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controlled I/O. For this reason, the data acquisition system features amplifier circuits
compatible with each of these different forms of electrical control.
Typically, there are industry-accepted ranges of electrical signals used in ICSs.
The first and most common type of electrical control signal used in the ICS industry is
low power current, typically ranging from either 4 mA to 20 mA or 0 mA to 20 mA. The
second most common type of electrical control signal used is voltage which can typically
range from -10V to 10V, 0V to 5V, 0V to 10V, etc. The final type of electrical control
signal is low power PWM which typically has voltage levels of 0V and 5V with a varying
duty cycle.
ADCs will convert an analog signal to digital value based on a reference voltage,
VREF. If an ADC produces digital values with N bits, then numbers from 0 to 2N – 1 will
represent the input analog voltage from 0V to VREF. The number 0 would represent 0V
and the number 2N – 1 would represent the reference voltage VREF. The analog to digital
conversion process is presented in Figure 6.2 [27], where the analog signal u(t) is
converted to a digital signal D with N bits.

Figure 6.2

Analog to Digital Conversion Process
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Sometimes a control system may not utilize the full electrical range when
controlling a device. If the output of the amplifier circuit utilizes a portion of the voltage
range of 0V to VREF , then the output of the ADC will not utilize the full digital resolution
of N bits. This is suboptimal, and cases like this occur frequently. For example, a heater
may only require a 3V to 6V range while the entire control system has a 0V to 10V
supply. In this case, only 30% of the digital space would be utilized by the ADC. For this
reason, each amplifier circuit on the control tap is designed to have modular amplification
stages to fine tune the output voltage based on the input criterium of the ICS application.
Current Sensor Circuit
Before the current inputs and outputs of a control system can be converted to a
digital value and measured, they must be converted to a voltage. To achieve this, a
resistor can be placed in series with the I/O signal to measure the voltage drop across it.
By using Ohm’s law V = IR, current can be calculated by modifying the equation to I =
V/R. However, placing a resistor in series with the load may alter the electrical behavior
of the control system, which is unacceptable. To avoid this, using a very small resistor in
comparison to the load will add negligible change to the total resistance while still
allowing measurement of the voltage across the resistor.
Amplifying the differential voltage across the resistor will require a differential
amplifier circuit to produce an output voltage referenced to ground. This setup could
convert a 0 mA to 20 mA signal into a 0 V to 4V output signal. Figure 6.3 depicts a
differential amplifier circuit and its gain equation. If the control system is using a smaller
range of the total current range, for example 10 mA to 15 mA the of 0 mA to 20 mA, then
a second differential amplifier circuit is required produce the same 0V to 4V output
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signal. This is done via a second differential amplification stage. In this second stage, the
lower end of the voltage range is subtracted from the input and then amplified. The
circuit was designed to produce a final output that is within the acceptable range of
voltages for the ADC. Figure 6.4 depicts the current amplification stages performed by
the control tap circuit before producing a digitized value.

Figure 6.3

Differential Amplifier Circuit

Figure 6.5 depicts each of the sub circuits of the current sensing circuit. The first
electrical circuit is the sensing resistor in series with the control system load. The second
electrical circuit is a voltage divider network that divides the voltages on either side of
the sensing resistor. This voltage division is performed due to the electrical limits of
amplifiers. Amplifiers are rated for maximum voltages, and because the ICS application
may be using voltages that exceed these limits, voltage division may be required.
Additionally, the voltage divider network is implemented using high impedance resistors
to maintain the high impedance of the control tap circuit. After the voltage divider
network, the divided voltages are input into buffer amplifier circuits. These amplifiers are
electrically isolating due to their naturally large impedance and ability to buffer the
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control system from the sensing circuit. The outputs of the buffer amplifier circuits are
the positive and negative inputs to the first differential amplifier stage. The output of the
first amplifier stage is the positive input to the second amplifier stage, and the negative
input is an adjustable voltage supply that subtracts the low ended voltage before
amplification. Finally, the second stage differential amplifier output is connected to an
ADC.

Figure 6.4

Figure 6.5

Current Amplification Stages

Current Sensor Amplifier Circuit
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In summary, there are five different electrical or amplification stages used in the
current sensing circuit to produce an output voltage within an acceptable range for an
ADC. This circuit was designed to be configurable for different ICS applications without
impacting the control process due to high input impedance.
Voltage Sensor Circuit
The voltage sensing circuit follows the same principles as the current sensing
circuit. The main difference between the two circuits is that there is no sensing resistor or
buffer amplifiers to measure a voltage across the resistor. Instead, a voltage is already
provided, and the first stage of amplification is a standard single-ended amplifier. The
voltage divider network and second amplification stage of the voltage sensing circuit is
identical to the current sensing circuit. Figure 6.6 depicts the visibly simpler voltage
sensing circuit.

Figure 6.6

Voltage Sensing Amplifier Circuit
PWM Sensor Circuit

The PWM sensing circuit follows the same principles as the prior two circuits.
The PWM signal needs to be averaged before conversion to an analog representation of
the duty cycle. Because of this, there is a distinct difference in the PWM sensing circuit
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from the other two circuits. Instead of a first stage of amplification, the PWM signal goes
through a second order low-pass filter to integrate the signal to an average value. Figure
6.7 depicts how a PWM signal and its varying duty cycles can be averaged to a stable
output voltage.

Figure 6.7

Pulse Width Modulation

Once the voltage has been averaged out, the output of the filter can be sent into
the second stage of amplification. The voltage divider network and second stage of the
PWM sensing circuit is identical to the prior two circuits. Figure 6.8 depicts the PWM
sensing circuit who’s first amplification stage is notably different than the previous two
circuits.

88

Figure 6.8

PWM Sensing Amplifier Circuit
ADC Interface

Once the desired ranges of voltages are received from the chosen sensor amplifier
circuit, the values can be digitized by an ADC circuit and retrieved by a microprocessor.
The chosen microcontroller for the thesis proposal was a Raspberry Pi 4, which has a 40pin general purpose input/output (GPIO) interface for serial communication and generalpurpose digital control. The Raspberry Pi 4 also has a dedicated serial peripheral interface
(SPI) hardware unit which can be configured and controlled through software via a
hardware driver. The microcontroller can assert selection pins to select which ADC to
read from via a chip selecting circuit. All the circuitry, from sensing circuits to ADCs and
their chip selecting circuit, was designed and manufactured onto a printed circuit board
(PCB). Once assembled, the PCB can be mounted onto the Raspberry Pi’s 40-pin GPIO
interface for easy integration. This 40-pin interface and the pinout functionality is
presented in Figure 6.9 [29].
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Figure 6.9

Raspberry Pi GPIO Interface

SPI protocol is a serial communication protocol in which a master unit can
communicate with one or many slave devices to read from or write to. Figure 6.10
depicts the common structure of an SPI master unit connected to SPI slave(s). SPI has 4
different digital inputs and outputs: the system clock (SCLK), slave select (SS), master
output / slave input (MOSI), master input / slave output (MISO). The clock signal drives
the protocol and serves as the heartbeat to time each SPI transaction. The slave select is
used to activate the slave with which the master is communicating. Lastly, the
MISO/MOSI lines are used for duplex communication between the master and the slave.
The only difference in between the SPI structure depicted in Figure 6.10 and the
Raspberry Pi 4’s SPI interface is that the SPI interface on the Raspberry Pi 4 only has a
singular slave select pin, meaning it is only capable of selecting a singular slave. For this
reason, the ADC interface must also have a slave selecting circuit that can select as many
slaves as it needs. The PCB is equipped with 4 of each type of sensing circuit, meaning
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there are 12 ADC slaves on the board. To accommodate the need of 12 different slaveselect pins, a chip selecting circuit was devised.

Figure 6.10

Typical SPI Structure

This chip selecting circuit takes in 4 GPIO select signals, and a 4x16 decoder
allows for the selecting of all 12 ADCs. The ADCs being used have active LOW slave
select pins, meaning when the slave select line is 0V, the slave is active. The 4x16
decoder uses active LOW selecting to meet these requirements. Figure 6.11 depicts the
layout of the designed ADC chip selecting circuit.
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Figure 6.11

ADC Chip Selecting Circuit

This chip selecting circuit only allows for a single ADC to be controlling the
MISO data bus at any given moment. When the master wants data from a slave, it will
assert the necessary selecting pins and supply the SCLK to the slave devices. When this
occurs, the activated slave will return its digitized value to the master over the MISO line
one bit at a time. For example, if the Raspberry Pi 4 wants data from ADC number 7, it
will assert the slave select pins {SEL3, SEL2, SEL1, SEL0} = ‘0 1 1 1’ (7 in binary) and
send the SCLK signal until the transaction has been completed.
The front and back of the PCB described in this chapter are presented on the next
two pages in Figures 6.12 and 6.13. The schematics of the PCB design are included in
Appendix A.
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Figure 6.12

PCB and Raspberry Pi (front)
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Figure 6.13

PCB and Raspberry Pi (back)
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CHAPTER 7: SOFTWARE DESIGN
While the front end of the system is based in hardware, the remainder of the
proposed data acquisition system is configured in software. For purposes of
demonstration, a mock IDS process was designed to exhibit the capabilities of the data
acquisition system. There are 3 main processes that are responsible for performing the
data acquisition, monitoring, and detection of anomalous behavior.
The first process reads and formats the serial data retrieved from an ADC before
handing it off to the next process. A hardware driver communicates with the hardware via
an SPI interface which is configured before any transactions take place. This serves as an
application program interface (API) to any process that wants to retrieve out-of-band data
from the hardware via requests and responses.
The second process performs in-band data reads from a PLC via the ModBus
protocol and has a very similar function to the ADC hardware driver. The ModBus reader
process connects to a PLC over a TCP/IP network connection and reads register data
from the PLC’s internal register space. This process serves as an API to any process that
wants to retrieve in-band data from the PLC via requests and responses.
The third process is a control monitoring process that interfaces with the two
aforementioned processes. This process interfaces with both APIs to make read requests
from designated ADCs or PLC registers. The process receives the responses of incoming
data from the two APIs and performs simple control monitoring by comparing the data to
each other. The control monitoring contains a file of a recorded normal process behavior.
The process performs comparisons on the ADC data, PLC data, and known process
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behavior data. In comparing these channels of data, discrepancies may arise. This process
has settings to configure what level of discrepancies to trigger the generation of security
alerts. Figure 7.1 depicts the control process flow and paths for inter process
communication.
In a real ICS environment, the IDSs employed are sophisticated and
interconnected. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand the importance of, and to
demonstrate increased control system hardware visibility via the data acquisition system.
If data scientists should find the data acquisition system of benefit for their systems, they
must determine how the data acquisition system can be integrated into their existing IDS
infrastructure.

Figure 7.1

IDS Software Flow

The source code for each of the processes described in the next sections are
included in Appendix B.
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ADC Reader API
The Raspberry Pi 4 comes equipped with a system on a chip (SoC), the
BCM2835, which has many different integrated subsystems. Figure 7.2 depicts the
BCM2835 SoC block diagram which details the CPU, GPU, memory, and some key
peripherals typically used in embedded environments. The ADC reader API was written
in C to access the SPI hardware driver libraries written for the BCM2835 SoC. This
library is open source and can configure the settings of the SPI hardware peripheral. Once
configured the library can read from and write to slaves via the designated SPI pins on
the 40-pin GPIO header.

Figure 7.2

BCM2835 SoC Block Diagram

First, the API configures all the SPI settings. The process initializes all BCM2835
peripherals such as the SPI module and performs error handling if any of these
initialization steps were to fail. Second, the process performs the configuration of the
initialized SPI module. Once SPI has been configured, the process begins a polling mode
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where it waits for SPI transaction requests from another process. When a request is
received, the ADC Reader API fulfills the request by reading from the appropriate ADC
and responding with the formatted data.
The ADC reader retrieved data from the appropriate ADC by asserting the GPIO
selection pins associated with the ADC. Once asserted, the SPI driver is activated to read
the raw serial data from the ADC over the MISO line. The ADCs are 12 bits, but the data
that is received from the ADCs is contained in two 8-bit packets. The ADCs used were
MCP3201s, and their datasheet details the format in which the data is received [23]. To
make use of the received data, it must be modified to extract the 12 bits from the
combined 16-bit data packet. Figure 7.3 depicts the formatting of the 16-bit data packet
obtained from the MCP3201 datasheet.

Figure 7.3

ADC SPI Transaction Format

Additionally, the SPI drivers are only capable of performing 8-bit SPI
transactions, meaning two separate SPI transactions must occur to read from the full
buffer inside the ADC. Based on this format, the first 8-bit buffer, buffer[0], will contain
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the upper byte coming from the ADC. The second 8-bit buffer, buffer[1], will contain the
lower byte coming from the ADC. Once the data has been retrieved, it needs to be
converted to the 12-bit number that was originally stored inside the ADC. The bottom of
Figure 7.3 depicts the logical operations used to perform this conversion ( << N is logical
shift left by N bits. >> N is logical shift right by N bits. | is bitwise OR. & is bitwise
AND. )
PLC Reader API
The PLC used in the test control system environment is the Allen-Bradley (AB)
Micro 850. The PLC and its internal control process were configured and programmed
using the free to use Connected Components Workbench developed by Rockwell
Automation. Besides configuring the control process, the user can configure where
different control process constants, variables, and control I/O is stored in its internal
register space. The PLC Reader API was written to fulfill read requests to the PLC by
retrieving register data via the ModBus protocol. Since ModBus is the industry standard
protocol in the ICS environment for communicating with different control entities, it is
also the protocol that defines the register space that the user can configure.
The ModBus register space region is defined as a range of registers typically
starting from address 0 and counting to 65,535. The first 10,000 (00001 – 09999)
registers are write-only registers that are allocated for output driver switches which are
digital outputs that activate and deactivate different physical components such as motors,
relays, or valves. The second 10,000 (10001 – 19999) registers are read-only registers
that are allocated for digital input contacts that store status information of different
physical components. The third 10,000 (20001 – 29999) registers are read-only registers

99
that are allocated for analog inputs which hold the digitized values of feedback
information being used for control, such as pressure level, speed, temperature, etc. The
fourth 10,000 (30001 – 39999) registers are write-only registers that are allocated for
analog outputs that drive the control process to perform physical actions such as
operating a motor or increasing the temperature inside of a vessel.
Since the Raspberry Pi 4 has ethernet and wireless communication abilities, it can
be connected to the same network as the PLC. The PLC Reader process uses this network
connection to read the internal register space and fulfill read requests in a similar fashion
as the ADC reader process. The PLC reader process is configured with the static IP
address of the PLC and the proper register address range for the control signals inside of
the PLC.
The PLC Reader process is simple, was written in Python, and makes use of a
library called “uModBus”. The PLC reader process configures and establishes a network
socket connection to the PLC. Once connected, it then enters its main program loop
where it waits for a Modbus read request that it can initiate to the PLC. Once receiving
the data back from the PLC, the process fulfills the request by responding with the
internal register data.
Control Monitoring Process
The control monitoring process compares the PLC control process data, the data
acquisition system’s data, and a record known control process. This is accomplished in
real-time by requesting data from the PLC and ADC APIs. Periodically, the process
requests data from both the PLC and out-of-band data acquisition unit and then records
the data. Using this data, the process stores a constantly updated array of data recorded
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from the PLC and data acquisition unit. The width of this array, and a few other
parameters such as error tolerance and error count tolerance are configurable and can be
used to tighten or loosen conditions required to generate an alert.
The control monitoring process starts by priming the sliding time window with
data from each of the input locations including: the control tap, the PLC, and the known
control process. Once the window of time has been filled, the control monitoring process
begins by comparing each of the time-series inputs with one another. In the case of the
example control system, the primary control variable is the water level of the tank. The
control process compares the both the control tap and PLC values to each other with the
known control process. If any of the compared values exceed the tolerance boundaries, an
alert is generated and handed off to the security alert process.
Figure 7.4 depicts normal control process behavior without any disturbances to
the control signals. Figure 7.5 depicts the normal control process behavior with an added
disturbance in the system which is picked up by the data acquisition unit and PLC. In this
case, the control monitoring system generates alerts signaling to the administrator alert
process that both the data acquisition unit and PLC have returned control signals that
deviate from the normal control process behavior.
In addition to normal and disturbed process behavior, the data acquisition unit
was able to detect instances where the PLC was reporting false information. Figure 7.6
depicts an instance where a harsh disturbance was applied to the control system, yet the
PLC reported normal behavior. Figure 7.7 depicts an instance where the PLC reported a
completely different behavior than the physical control process behavior. In this case, the
PLC reported a sinusoidal process while the control system followed a sawtooth
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behavior. In both cases, the data acquisition system was able to detect a discrepancy in
the false information presented by the PLC and the physical system behavior.
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Figure 7.4

Figure 7.5

Normal Control Process Behavior

Disturbed Control Process Behavior

103

Figure 7.6

Figure 7.7

Undetected Disturbance

False Control Process
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CHAPTER 8: FUTURE RESEARCH
Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning
The main purpose of this Masters’ thesis is to propose and demonstrate a new data
acquisition system at the lowest level of the control hierarchy. Integrating this data
acquisition into a larger and more sophisticated IDS is outside the scope of this thesis.
The control monitoring software implemented in this thesis is rudimentary and for
demonstrative purposes. Realistically, industrial control facilities have more sophisticated
real-time IDSs which involve databases of historic behavior, rule sets, and some form of
machine learning (ML) with artificial intelligence (AI). By training some form of AI
algorithm with known and expected behavior, industrial control facilities can detect and
prevent attacks when they are occurring in real time by detecting anomalous behavior.
IDSs are frequently used in signature-based environments such as networks or on
operating systems. However, for the purposes of protecting the physical control
processes, there have been studies and implementations of IDSs that train AI to detect
anomalous behavior at the control process level. The control process signals are digitized
inputs and outputs that are being controlled by PLCs in the Field Layer. By training AI
with many instances of this control process data, the AI can detect small to large
deviations from the expected behavior.
Unfortunately, this intrusion detection model begins to deteriorate when trust in
the training data and real-time data is compromised. In attacks such as data poisoning or
data subversion, control process data being returned from the PLCs can be illegitimate
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and cause problems in the training and detection phases of the AI/ML IDS model. If the
data is compromised, it may cause the AI/ML algorithms to misclassify unwanted
behavior. This can cause detection problems because the AI within the IDS has been
trained to classify improper behavior as expected and normal. In addition to data
poisoning during the training phase, component degradation and data subversion attacks
during the detection phase may cause data to be illegitimate and appear normal while
failures occur. In this circumstance, the IDS receiving illegitimate data may not be able to
detect the unwanted behavior.
For this reason, the work of this thesis may be of use in the field of AI/ML [3].
This out-of-band channel of control process information recorded at the control process
layer may be leveraged as an additional input to these AI/ML algorithms. By having inband and out-of-band data acquisition channels, increased visibility may enable AI/ML
algorithms to detect small discrepancies in the channels of data, signaling component
degradation or a data subversion attack. Additionally, the data acquisition system can be
used to verify the legitimacy of the data used in the training of AI/ML algorithms. By
integrating the proposed data acquisition system into existing ICS IDSs , ICS security
may be bolstered increasing system visibility and data resiliency.
FPGA Data Acquisition
The proposed data acquisition system introduces new vulnerabilities to the ICS
network. The microcontroller performing data acquisition is running software on an
operating system or bare metal resources. This exposes avenues on the ICS network by
which attackers may inject code to compromise the out-of-band data acquisition system.
An approach that would fix this problem would be to design the entire data acquisition

106
system in hardware. In an architecture entirely comprised of hardware, there would be no
avenues by which the attacker could inject malware into the data acquisition system.
A versatile method of implementing a hardware data acquisition unit is via the
utilization of a field programmable gate array (FPGA). FPGAs are reconfigurable
hardware units that are commonly used in hardware prototyping or hardware systems that
require functional flexibility and low cost. FPGAs are equipped with many different
types of resources that are used to implement custom hardware logic and computational
solutions repeatedly on the same chip. Within FPGA’s there are configurable logic blocks
(CLBs), I/O blocks, memory blocks, interconnect lines, etc. Configurable logic blocks are
used to implement user logic. I/O blocks are used to transport data in and off the FPGA
chip. Memory blocks are used for data storage. Lastly, interconnect lines are used to
connect and route these resources together to form a complete hardware design. Figure
8.1 highlights these commonly used resources.

Figure 8.1

FPGA Resources

107
For purposes of demonstration, a simple FPGA data acquisition unit was designed
and integrated with the PCB described in Chapter 6. The FPGA board used in this
demonstration was the Digilent Nexys4 DDR FPGA board. The FPGA hardware design
was specifically created to replace the data acquisition functionality of the Raspberry Pi
microcontroller. In the example design, a serial universal asynchronous receive/transmit
(UART) connection is made through the FPGA. This connection is used to send data
packets containing the desired number of the ADC. Once the packet is received by the
FPGA, the FPGA logic asserts the necessary chip selecting signals to activate the desired
ADC. Once the ADC is selected, the FPGA design uses the SPI protocol to retrieve the
data packet from the ADC. Once the data is acquired, it is returned to the PC host over
the serial UART connection. Figure 8.2 depicts the layout of the FPGA data acquisition
system. Figure 8.3 depicts the block design programmed into the FPGA.

Figure 8.2

FPGA Data Acquisition System
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Figure 8.3

FPGA Block Design

Figure 8.4 shows the connections made between the PC, the FPGA board, and the
PCB. The USB UART connection is on the left of the green FPGA board. The GPIO and
SPI signals were connected from the FPGA board to the PCB using jumper cables.

Figure 8.4

FPGA / PCB Connection
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Figure 8.5 depicts an oscilloscope capture of the SPI clock (yellow), and the SPI
data packet (blue). Figure 8.6 depicts the data being returned to the PC via the serial
connection and displayed in a terminal. While the design is very simple, the main purpose
of this demonstration was to show how an FPGA could replace the microcontroller in the
data acquisition system. In doing so there is no operating system or software running in
the entire design.

Figure 8.5

Figure 8.6

SPI Waveform

Serial Terminal Data Responses
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However, there are many improvements that can be made to this hardware design.
The FPGA development board has unnecessary peripheral interfaces and resources
equipped that could potentially expose vulnerabilities to the design. This design can be
improved by integrating the FPGA chip onto the PCB to keep the data acquisition unit
tightly coupled to a single board. Lastly, since ICS environments and all their
components exist on an ICS network, the final improvement would be modifying the
FPGA design to make it an ethernet capable device. This modification would allow IDSs
to query data from a secure out-of-band data acquisition source. The FPGA design,
referred to as a bitstream, could be stored on a non-volatile memory source on the PCB
allowing the FPGA to be loaded with the secure hardware design when the device is
powered up. Using this approach, the entire data acquisition system would exist on a
single board that requires a single 5V power supply.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) play a large role in modern civilization,
whether it be through the manufacturing of products, or the maintenance of critical
infrastructure. ICS and the facilities that house them are complex and interconnected,
allowing for sophisticated control of processes that keep civilization moving forward.
Due to the significant investments of both capital and intelligence to form ICSs and their
facilities, protection from external forces is required. These external forces range from
unavoidable erosions of system components over time to the malicious actions of APTs.
The fortification of ICS facilities and their internal systems has been an ongoing effort
since the conception of the ICS. ICS cybersecurity is a topic that appears limitless in
depth, with new developments made every year to increase the strength and resiliency of
cybersecurity systems that protect ICS technology.
Over the course of decades, best cybersecurity practices have been established.
Each practice aims at addressing an existing attack vector, and together the best practices
seek to fortify the entire attack surface of ICSs and the facilities that house them. This
thesis covered various best practices, such as the removal of unnecessary features, data
integrity, authentication & authorization, secure communication protocols, intrusion
detection systems (IDSs), and network enclave. In the face of an abundance of
cybersecurity practices, finding the best path forward based on the given application can
be intimidating and time-consuming. The MITRE ATT&CK Framework was devised to
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give industries a way to perform threat intelligence, threat mitigation, and assessments on
their fortifications.
However, despite the intense efforts to protect ICSs and their systems from
intrusion, APTs manage to seep through the cracks with near limitless time and money to
support their endeavors. In cyber-attacks such as Stuxnet, the ICS community was faced
with new challenges because existing cybersecurity practices were inadequate, and the
adversary remained undetected even when the attack was taking place. Since
cybersecurity is no silver bullet, flaws in defenses will always exist, and a focus on
making ICS systems resilient has become an increasingly important topic in recent years.
Addressing the topic of resiliency is an ongoing effort, as the term resiliency is
defined differently depending on the given application. Researchers have attempted to
define resiliency in many ways, such as cyber resiliency and system resiliency. Within
each definition there exists different goals, objectives, and techniques by which resiliency
is achieved. Within modern ICS cybersecurity practices, many of these goals and
objectives are achieved by the given techniques. However, one challenge the ICS
community is currently faced with relates to system visibility and contextual awareness.
Current ICS cybersecurity practices place emphasis on fortifying information
technology (IT) around ICSs. Actively scanning for internal threats within ICS
environments requires an availability of control status information from operational
technology (OT). However, if operational technology has degraded over time, or been
infiltrated by an adversary, control status information may be skewed or outright false.
Since the protection mechanisms put in place require information from potentially
degrading or corrupted sources, a paradox arises.
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This thesis investigated the topics of system thinking and data resiliency to give
context into what might be done to break this paradox. A mechanism that can provide
visibility and contextual awareness to physical control process information is proposed.
The introduction of an out-of-band data acquisition system residing at the physical
control process level may solve some of the issues relating to system visibility. By
acquiring data from an out-of-band channel, a direct view of the system level behavior
can be utilized by modern ICS cybersecurity solutions such as IDSs. The introduction of
a data acquisition system allows for the verification of in-band sources of ICS data, such
as data returned from programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Due to this, trust is not
inherently placed in devices that are subject to degradation and infiltration.
This thesis detailed the electrical design of the data acquisition unit. The unit was
designed to be applied to different types of control signals (e.g. current-controlled,
voltage-controlled, and PWM-controlled). This thesis also demonstrated the software
design and system integration of the data acquisition system in a simplified testbed
consisting of a water tank control system. The application of the proposed data
acquisition unit is up to security engineers in ICS applications.
By integrating the proposed system into modern ICS cybersecurity applications,
cyber, system, and data resiliency may be achieved. The cybersecurity application of
real-time anomaly-based IDSs may benefit from an out-of-band data source. This out-ofband data source can be a step of verification and validation of data used in artificial
intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) algorithms within IDSs.
The integration of a data acquisition such as the one proposed in this thesis could
bolster security for OT within the physical environment, which is something that is
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lacking in modern ICS security. With increased visibility, computer worms such as
Stuxnet would have a much more difficult time slipping under the radar as the electrical
signals are closely monitored within the physical environment. Malware infections within
PLCs that enable data subversion and data poisoning attacks could be stifled and nearly
impossible to perform as analog electrical signals cannot be hacked like bits and bytes. In
order to combat the seemingly bottomless resources of APTs, it is imperative that the ICS
community adopts creativity with its cybersecurity approaches. The idea proposed within
this thesis breaches the normal digital approach to solve a digital problem. In doing so,
this thesis synthesizes the analog world with the digital world to form a cohesive security
posture within the ICS environment.
By itself, the data acquisition unit is just a hunk of silicon and metal. The power
of such a unit lies in the hands of the engineers and scientists. For those who wish to
bolster the security of the infrastructure that fuels the forward motion of modern
civilization, the work within this thesis offers an avenue forward, and hopefully it
inspires future developments in the field of ICS security.
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APPENDIX A
PCB Schematic
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APPENDIX B
Source Code
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ADC Reader Program
/*
* Description: adc_reader.c
*
This program reads and returns 12-bit values from 12 ADCs.
*
The program first initializes the SPI module on the BCM2835
processor on the Raspberry Pi.
*
The main program loop waits for stdin unsiged integer (0 - 11),
and returns selected ADC
*
value over stdout.
*
* Author:
*
Daniel Bovard ...
(danielbovard@u.boisestate.edu)
*/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define

"../deps/bcm2835/bcm2835.h"
<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
<unistd.h>
<string.h>
<signal.h>
<fcntl.h>
<sys/stat.h>
<sys/types.h>
SEL0
SEL1
SEL2
SEL3
STRB
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23
24
25
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/* Signal interupt declarations */
int terminate = 0;
int status;
/* In/Out pipe declarations */
int fifoFd;
int bytesRead;
const char* adcFifo = "tmp/adcFifo";
char inStr[5], outStr[5];
/* ADC transfer declarations */
uint8_t sel;
uint8_t* buf;
uint16_t value;
/* Function prototypes */
void init_device();
void handle_sigint(int signal_number);
int check_sigint();
void chip_select(uint8_t sel);
int main()
{
/* Initialize SIGINT (ctrl+c) handler */
struct sigaction sa;
memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(struct sigaction));
sa.sa_handler = handle_sigint;
sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
/* Initialize device */
init_device();
// Allocate memory space for ADC data
buf = malloc(2*sizeof(uint8_t));
// Main program loop
while(1)
{
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// Clear input buffer
memset(&inStr, 0, sizeof(inStr));
sleep(1);
// Open named FIFO pipe 'adcFifo' in read mode
fifoFd = open(adcFifo, O_RDONLY);
if (fifoFd == -1)
{
printf("Failed to open adcFifo.\n");
return -1;
}
do
{

// Read selection number from input pipe
bytesRead = read(fifoFd, inStr, sizeof(inStr));
status = check_sigint();
if(status) return status;

}
while (bytesRead == 0);

// Exit loop when data is read

// Close pipe
close(fifoFd);
// Open named FIFO pipe 'adcFifo' in write mode
fifoFd = open(adcFifo, O_WRONLY);
if (fifoFd == -1)
{
printf("Failed to open adcFifo.\n");
return -1;
}
// Select chip
sel = atoi(inStr);
chip_select(sel);
// SPI read from selected ADC
bcm2835_spi_transfern(buf, 2);
// Deassert Chip Select
chip_select(15);
// Extract 12 bits from 16 bit packet
value = (((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])) >> 1) & 0x0FFF;
//printf("ADC %d data: %d\n", sel, value);
snprintf((char*)&outStr, sizeof(outStr), "%d", value);
// Write ADC data to output pipe
write(fifoFd, outStr, strlen(outStr)+1);
// Close pipe
close(fifoFd);
status = check_sigint();
if(status) return status;

}

}
return 1;

void init_device()
{
// Initialize low-level BCM2835 functionality
if(!bcm2835_init())
{
printf("Error initializing BCM2835.\n");
return;
}
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// Initialize BCM2835 SPI modules
if(!bcm2835_spi_begin())
{
printf("Error intializing BCM2835 SPI module.\n");
return;
}
// Configure SPI0 Channel
bcm2835_spi_setBitOrder(BCM2835_SPI_BIT_ORDER_MSBFIRST);
first is only mode supported by SPI0
bcm2835_spi_setDataMode(BCM2835_SPI_MODE0);
Rising edge enabled clock, samples at middle of data bit
bcm2835_spi_setClockDivider(BCM2835_SPI_CLOCK_DIVIDER_16384);
15.25878906kHz on Rpi2, 24.4140625kHz on RPI3
bcm2835_spi_chipSelect(BCM2835_SPI_CS0);
as chip select
bcm2835_spi_setChipSelectPolarity(BCM2835_SPI_CS0, 1);
active HIGH

}

// Init GPIO signals
bcm2835_gpio_fsel(SEL0, BCM2835_GPIO_FSEL_OUTP);
bcm2835_gpio_set_pud(SEL0, BCM2835_GPIO_PUD_UP);
bcm2835_gpio_fsel(SEL1, BCM2835_GPIO_FSEL_OUTP);
bcm2835_gpio_set_pud(SEL1, BCM2835_GPIO_PUD_UP);
bcm2835_gpio_fsel(SEL2, BCM2835_GPIO_FSEL_OUTP);
bcm2835_gpio_set_pud(SEL2, BCM2835_GPIO_PUD_UP);
bcm2835_gpio_fsel(SEL3, BCM2835_GPIO_FSEL_OUTP);
bcm2835_gpio_set_pud(SEL3, BCM2835_GPIO_PUD_UP);
bcm2835_gpio_fsel(STRB, BCM2835_GPIO_FSEL_OUTP);
bcm2835_gpio_set_pud(STRB, BCM2835_GPIO_PUD_UP);
chip_select(15);

void chip_select(uint8_t sel)
{
// Assert GPIO signals per input select
if (sel & 0x01) bcm2835_gpio_set(SEL0);
else
bcm2835_gpio_clr(SEL0);
if (sel & 0x02) bcm2835_gpio_set(SEL1);
else
bcm2835_gpio_clr(SEL1);
if (sel & 0x04) bcm2835_gpio_set(SEL2);
else
bcm2835_gpio_clr(SEL2);
if (sel & 0x08) bcm2835_gpio_set(SEL3);
else
bcm2835_gpio_clr(SEL3);
// Generous set up time
usleep(1);
// Assert Strobe for input latching
bcm2835_gpio_set(STRB);
// Strobe Pulse
usleep(1);
// Deassert Strobe for input latching
bcm2835_gpio_clr(STRB);
}
void handle_sigint(int signal_number)
{
if (signal_number == SIGINT)
{
terminate = 1;
}
}
int check_sigint()
{
if (terminate)
{
bcm2835_spi_end();
return 1;
}
else return 0;
}

// MSB
//
// 16384 =
// Using CS0
// CS0 is
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PLC Reader Program
import socket
import numpy as np
from umodbus import conf
from umodbus.client import tcp
from time import sleep
import csv
PLC_ADDR = '192.168.1.101'
PLC_PORT = 502
conf.SIGNED_VALUES = True
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.connect((PLC_ADDR, PLC_PORT))
plcFifo = "tmp/plcFifo"
while(True):
fifoFd = open(plcFifo, 'r')
plcAddr = fifoFd.read()
fifoFd.close()
# Perform modbus request
try:
message = tcp.read_input_registers(slave_id=0,
starting_address=int(plcAddr), quantity=1)
response = tcp.send_message(message, sock)
# Stdout transfer response packet
fifoFd = open(plcFifo, 'w')
plcAddr = fifoFd.write(str(int(response[0])))
fifoFd.close()
except (KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit):
print()
sock.close()
break
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Control Monitor Process
import numpy as np
import os
import csv
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import signal
import sys
from time import sleep
SAMPLE_TIME = 5
MINUTE = 60
WINDOW_TIME = MINUTE*60
WINDOW_SIZE = int(WINDOW_TIME/SAMPLE_TIME)
MAX = 4095
PROC_VAL_TOL = int(0.10 * MAX)
A2D_VAL_TOL = int(0.05 * MAX)
PLC_MODE = True
PROCESS_PATH = "data/sinewave_process.csv"
TANK_ADC_ADDR = 0
TANK_PLC_ADDR = 25
adcFifo = "tmp/adcFifo"
plcFifo = "tmp/plcFifo"
adc_tank_list = []
plc_tank_list = []
def signal_handler(sig, frame):
print("Process terminated.")
print("Performing cleanup...")
os.remove("tmp/adcFifo")
if PLC_MODE:
os.remove("tmp/plcFifo")
global adc_tank_list
adc_tank_csv = np.array(adc_tank_list).reshape(len(adc_tank_list), 1)
print(adc_tank_csv)
with open("data/adc_process.csv", 'w') as file:
writer = csv.writer(file)
writer.writerows(adc_tank_csv)
file.close()
sys.exit(0)
def create_pipes():
try:
os.mkfifo(adcFifo, mode=0o666)
except OSError:
print("Failed to create ADC FIFO")
if PLC_MODE:
try:
os.mkfifo(plcFifo, mode=0o666)
except OSError:
print("Failed to create PLC FIFO")
def read_adc_value(select):
fifoFd = open(adcFifo, 'w')
fifoFd.write(str(int(select)))
fifoFd.close()
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fifoFd = open(adcFifo, 'r')
adcVal = fifoFd.read()
fifoFd.close()
return int(adcVal.rstrip('\x00'))
def read_plc_value(addr):
fifoFd = open(plcFifo, 'w')
fifoFd.write(str(int(addr)))
fifoFd.close()
fifoFd = open(plcFifo, 'r')
plcVal = fifoFd.read()
fifoFd.close()
return int(plcVal)
def update_list(val_list, val):
val_list.append(val)
if(len(val_list) > WINDOW_SIZE):
val_list.pop(0)
def linear_fit(y_coords):
length = len(y_coords)
x_coords = np.arange(0, length*SAMPLE_TIME, SAMPLE_TIME)
coeffs = np.polyfit(x_coords, y_coords, 1)
return coeffs
def plot_samples(fig, axw1, axs2, axs3, y_coords1, y_coords2, y_coords3, lin_fit):
length = len(y_coords1)
x_coords = np.arange(0, length*SAMPLE_TIME, SAMPLE_TIME)
axs1.cla()
axs2.cla()
axs3.cla()
axs1.scatter(x_coords, y_coords1)
axs2.scatter(x_coords, y_coords2)
axs3.scatter(x_coords, y_coords3)
if(lin_fit):
coeffs1 = linear_fit(y_coords1)
coeffs2 = linear_fit(y_coords2)
coeffs3 = linear_fit(y_coords3)
lin_fit1 = np.zeros(length)
lin_fit2 = np.zeros(length)
lin_fit3 = np.zeros(length)
for i in range(length):
lin_fit1[i] = coeffs1[1] + i*SAMPLE_TIME*coeffs1[0]
lin_fit2[i] = coeffs2[1] + i*SAMPLE_TIME*coeffs2[0]
lin_fit3[i] = coeffs3[1] + i*SAMPLE_TIME*coeffs3[0]
axs1.plot(x_coords, lin_fit1, 'r')
axs2.plot(x_coords, lin_fit2, 'r')
axs3.plot(x_coords, lin_fit3, 'r')
fig.canvas.draw()
def upload_process(path):
control_process = []
i = 0
with open(path, 'r') as ipc_file:
ipc_reader = csv.reader(ipc_file, delimiter=',')
for row in ipc_reader:
if i != 0:
control_process.append(int(row[1]))
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i+=1
return control_process
def monitor_signals(path):
fig, axs = plt.subplots(1,1, figsize=(15,7))
fig.show()
fig.canvas.draw()
control_process = upload_process(path)
print(WINDOW_SIZE)
j = 0
while(True):
update_list(adc_tank_list, read_adc_value(TANK_ADC_ADDR))
if PLC_MODE:
update_list(plc_tank_list, read_plc_value(TANK_PLC_ADDR))
sleep(SAMPLE_TIME)
# Plot control process
plot_process(fig, axs, adc_tank_list, plc_tank_list) #,
control_process[j:j+WINDOW_SIZE])
j += 1
print("Process detection complete.")
return
def plot_process(fig, axs, analog, digital): #, expected):
length = len(analog)
a2d_low = np.zeros(len(analog))
a2d_high = np.zeros(len(analog))
x_coords = np.arange(0, length*SAMPLE_TIME, SAMPLE_TIME)
for i in range(len(analog)):
a2d_low[i] = digital[i] - A2D_VAL_TOL
a2d_high[i] = digital[i] + A2D_VAL_TOL
axs.cla()
plt.title("Tank Level Monitor")
axs.plot(x_coords, analog,
'r', label="Analog from ADC")
axs.plot(x_coords, digital, 'm', label="Digital from PLC")
axs.plot(x_coords, a2d_low, 'c--', label="A-D Tolerance Threshold")
axs.plot(x_coords, a2d_high, 'c--')
axs.legend()
fig.canvas.draw()
def main_process():
create_pipes()
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal_handler)
monitor_signals(PROCESS_PATH)

# Main Process
main_process()
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Data Acquisition Top
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Engineer: Daniel Bovard
--- Create Date: 04/11/2021 11:52:01 AM
-- Design Name: Data Acquisition System
-- Module Name: daq_top - rtl
-- Target Devices: XC7A100T-CSG324
-- Tool Versions: Vivado 2019.1
-- Description:
-Data acquisition unit for IDS ICS Thesis.
--Can recieve serial UART packets and parse hexadecimal numbers from them.
-Based on recieved number, GPIO pins are strobed to set a 4x16 decoder
-external to the FPGA. Once GPIO is set, SPI data packets are retrieved
-from a selected external ADC. Data packet is parsed and sent back over
-the UART serial connection.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.numeric_std.all;
entity daq_top is
port (
gpio_sel
gpio_strb

: out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
: out std_logic;

miso
sclk

: in std_logic;
: out std_logic;

rx
tx

: in std_logic;
: out std_logic;

gpio_led
flash_led

: out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
: out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);

err

: out std_logic;

clk
rst_n

: in
: in

);
end daq_top;

std_logic;
std_logic

architecture rtl of daq_top is
component daq_controller is
generic (
C_AXI_AWIDTH : integer := 4;
C_AXI_DWIDTH : integer := 32;
C_SPI_DWIDTH : integer := 16
);
port (
m_axi_uart_araddr : out std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH
m_axi_uart_arready : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_arvalid : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_awaddr : out std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH
m_axi_uart_awready : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_awvalid : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_bresp
: in std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
m_axi_uart_bready : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_bvalid : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_rdata
: in std_logic_vector(C_AXI_DWIDTH
m_axi_uart_rready : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_rresp
: in std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
m_axi_uart_rvalid : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_wdata
: out std_logic_vector(C_AXI_DWIDTH
m_axi_uart_wready : in std_logic;

- 1 downto 0);
- 1 downto 0);

- 1 downto 0);

- 1 downto 0);
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m_axi_uart_wstrb
m_axi_uart_wvalid

: out std_logic_vector((C_AXI_DWIDTH/8) - 1 downto 0);
: out std_logic;

gpio_sel
gpio_strb

: out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
: out std_logic;

spi_enable
spi_busy
spi_rxdata

: out std_logic;
: in std_logic;
: in std_logic_vector(C_SPI_DWIDTH - 1 downto 0);

err

: out std_logic;

clk
rst_n
);
end component;

: in
: in

std_logic;
std_logic

component spi_master is
generic(
slaves : integer := 4; --number of spi slaves
d_width : integer := 2); --data bus width
port(
clock
: IN
STD_LOGIC;
reset_n : IN
STD_LOGIC;
enable : IN
STD_LOGIC;
cpol
: IN
STD_LOGIC;
cpha
: IN
STD_LOGIC;
clk_div : IN
INTEGER;
per 1/2 period of sclk
miso
: IN
STD_LOGIC;
sclk
: OUT
STD_LOGIC;
busy
: OUT
STD_LOGIC;
signal
rx_data : OUT
STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(d_width-1 DOWNTO 0));
end component;
component axi_uartlite_0
port (
s_axi_aclk : in std_logic;
s_axi_aresetn : in std_logic;
interrupt : out std_logic;
s_axi_awaddr : in std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
s_axi_awvalid : in std_logic;
s_axi_awready : out std_logic;
s_axi_wdata : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
s_axi_wstrb : in std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
s_axi_wvalid : in std_logic;
s_axi_wready : out std_logic;
s_axi_bresp : out std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
s_axi_bvalid : out std_logic;
s_axi_bready : in std_logic;
s_axi_araddr : in std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
s_axi_arvalid : in std_logic;
s_axi_arready : out std_logic;
s_axi_rdata : out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
s_axi_rresp : out std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
s_axi_rvalid : out std_logic;
s_axi_rready : in std_logic;
rx : in std_logic;
tx : out std_logic
);
end component;
component BUFG is
port (
I : in std_logic;
O : out std_logic
);
end component;
component OBUF is

--system clock
--asynchronous reset
--initiate transaction
--spi clock polarity
--spi clock phase
--system clock cycles
--master in, slave out
--spi clock
--busy / data ready
--data received

137
port (
I : in std_logic;
O : out std_logic
);
end component;
constant C_AXI_AWIDTH : integer := 4;
constant C_AXI_DWIDTH : integer := 32;
constant C_SPI_DWIDTH : integer := 16;
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal
signal

m_axi_uart_araddr
m_axi_uart_arready
m_axi_uart_arvalid
m_axi_uart_awaddr
m_axi_uart_awready
m_axi_uart_awvalid
m_axi_uart_bresp
m_axi_uart_bready
m_axi_uart_bvalid
m_axi_uart_rdata
m_axi_uart_rready
m_axi_uart_rresp
m_axi_uart_rvalid
m_axi_uart_wdata
m_axi_uart_wready
m_axi_uart_wstrb
m_axi_uart_wvalid

signal spi_enable
signal spi_busy
signal spi_rxdata

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1
std_logic;
std_logic;
std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1
std_logic;
std_logic;
std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
std_logic;
std_logic;
std_logic_vector(C_AXI_DWIDTH - 1
std_logic;
std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
std_logic;
std_logic_vector(C_AXI_DWIDTH - 1
std_logic;
std_logic_vector((C_AXI_DWIDTH/8)
std_logic;

signal sclk_i : std_logic;
begin
flash_led_p : process (clk)
begin
if (rising_edge(clk)) then
flash_count <= flash_count + 1;
end if;
end process;
<=
<=
<=
<=

downto 0);

downto 0);

downto 0);
- 1 downto 0);

: std_logic;
: std_logic;
: std_logic_vector(C_SPI_DWIDTH - 1 downto 0);

signal gpio_sel_i : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
signal flash_count : unsigned(31 downto 0) := (others => '0');
signal flash_led_i : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);

flash_led(3)
flash_led(2)
flash_led(1)
flash_led(0)

downto 0);

flash_count(26);
flash_count(25);
flash_count(24);
flash_count(23);

daq_controller_i : daq_controller
generic map (
C_AXI_AWIDTH => C_AXI_AWIDTH,
C_AXI_DWIDTH => C_AXI_DWIDTH,
C_SPI_DWIDTH => C_SPI_DWIDTH
)
port map(
m_axi_uart_araddr => m_axi_uart_araddr,
m_axi_uart_arready => m_axi_uart_arready,
m_axi_uart_arvalid => m_axi_uart_arvalid,
m_axi_uart_awaddr => m_axi_uart_awaddr,
m_axi_uart_awready => m_axi_uart_awready,
m_axi_uart_awvalid => m_axi_uart_awvalid,
m_axi_uart_bresp
=> m_axi_uart_bresp,
m_axi_uart_bready => m_axi_uart_bready,
m_axi_uart_bvalid => m_axi_uart_bvalid,
m_axi_uart_rdata
=> m_axi_uart_rdata,
m_axi_uart_rready => m_axi_uart_rready,
m_axi_uart_rresp
=> m_axi_uart_rresp,
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);

m_axi_uart_rvalid
m_axi_uart_wdata
m_axi_uart_wready
m_axi_uart_wstrb
m_axi_uart_wvalid

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

m_axi_uart_rvalid,
m_axi_uart_wdata,
m_axi_uart_wready,
m_axi_uart_wstrb,
m_axi_uart_wvalid,

gpio_sel
gpio_strb

=> gpio_sel_i,
=> gpio_strb,

spi_enable
spi_busy
spi_rxdata

=> spi_enable,
=> spi_busy,
=> spi_rxdata,

err

=> err,

clk
rst_n

=> clk,
=> rst_n

spi_master_i : spi_master
generic map (
slaves => 1,
d_width => 16
)
port map (
clock
=> clk,
reset_n => '1',
enable => spi_enable,
cpol
=> '0',
cpha
=> '0',
clk_div => 100,
miso
=> miso,
sclk
=> sclk_i,
busy
=> spi_busy,
rx_data => spi_rxdata
);
axi_uartlite_0_i : axi_uartlite_0
PORT MAP (
s_axi_aclk
=> clk,
s_axi_aresetn => rst_n,
interrupt
=> open,
s_axi_awaddr => m_axi_uart_awaddr,
s_axi_awvalid => m_axi_uart_awvalid,
s_axi_awready => m_axi_uart_awready,
s_axi_wdata
=> m_axi_uart_wdata,
s_axi_wstrb
=> m_axi_uart_wstrb,
s_axi_wvalid => m_axi_uart_wvalid,
s_axi_wready => m_axi_uart_wready,
s_axi_bresp
=> m_axi_uart_bresp,
s_axi_bvalid => m_axi_uart_bvalid,
s_axi_bready => m_axi_uart_bready,
s_axi_araddr => m_axi_uart_araddr,
s_axi_arvalid => m_axi_uart_arvalid,
s_axi_arready => m_axi_uart_arready,
s_axi_rdata
=> m_axi_uart_rdata,
s_axi_rresp
=> m_axi_uart_rresp,
s_axi_rvalid => m_axi_uart_rvalid,
s_axi_rready => m_axi_uart_rready,
rx
=> rx,
tx
=> tx
);
gpio_led0_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(0),
O => gpio_led(0)
);
gpio_led1_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
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);

I => gpio_sel_i(1),
O => gpio_led(1)

gpio_led2_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(2),
O => gpio_led(2)
);
gpio_led3_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(3),
O => gpio_led(3)
);
gpio_sel0_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(0),
O => gpio_sel(0)
);
gpio_sel1_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(1),
O => gpio_sel(1)
);
gpio_sel2_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(2),
O => gpio_sel(2)
);
gpio_sel3_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => gpio_sel_i(3),
O => gpio_sel(3)
);
sclk_obuf_i : OBUF
port map (
I => sclk_i,
O => sclk
);
end rtl;

140
Data Acquisition Controller
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Engineer: Daniel Bovard
--- Create Date: 04/11/2021 11:52:01 AM
-- Design Name: Data Acquisition System
-- Module Name: daq_controller - rtl
-- Target Devices: XC7A100T-CSG324
-- Tool Versions: Vivado 2019.1
-- Description:
-Data acquisition controller for IDS ICS Thesis.
--The controller orchestrates the entire data acquisition process.
-First the controller polls the Xilinx AXI UARTLite LogiCORE IP
-for valid data packets. From there it parses the packets, asserts
-the GPIO, retrieves the SPI data packet, and returns the data
-back to the PC via the UART LogiCORE IP.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.numeric_std.all;
entity daq_controller is
generic (
C_AXI_AWIDTH : integer := 4;
C_AXI_DWIDTH : integer := 32;
C_SPI_DWIDTH : integer := 16
);
port (
m_axi_uart_araddr : out std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1
m_axi_uart_arready : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_arvalid : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_awaddr : out std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1
m_axi_uart_awready : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_awvalid : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_bresp
: in std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
m_axi_uart_bready : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_bvalid : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_rdata
: in std_logic_vector(C_AXI_DWIDTH - 1
m_axi_uart_rready : out std_logic;
m_axi_uart_rresp
: in std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
m_axi_uart_rvalid : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_wdata
: out std_logic_vector(C_AXI_DWIDTH - 1
m_axi_uart_wready : in std_logic;
m_axi_uart_wstrb
: out std_logic_vector((C_AXI_DWIDTH/8)
m_axi_uart_wvalid : out std_logic;

downto 0);
downto 0);

downto 0);

downto 0);
- 1 downto 0);

gpio_sel
gpio_strb

: out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
: out std_logic;

spi_enable
spi_busy
spi_rxdata

: out std_logic;
: in std_logic;
: in std_logic_vector(C_SPI_DWIDTH - 1 downto 0);

err

: out std_logic;

clk
rst_n
);
end daq_controller;

: in
: in

std_logic;
std_logic

architecture rtl of daq_controller is
constant C_UART_RX_ADDR : std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1 downto 0) := "0000";
constant C_UART_TX_ADDR : std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1 downto 0) := "0100";
constant C_UART_SR_ADDR : std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1 downto 0) := "1000";
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constant C_UART_CR_ADDR : std_logic_vector(C_AXI_AWIDTH - 1 downto 0) := "1100";
-- ASCII to Hex parser for numbers 0 through F
function parse_rx_uart (data: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return
std_logic_vector is
begin
case data is
when x"30" => return x"00";
when x"31" => return x"01";
when x"32" => return x"02";
when x"33" => return x"03";
when x"34" => return x"04";
when x"35" => return x"05";
when x"36" => return x"06";
when x"37" => return x"07";
when x"38" => return x"08";
when x"39" => return x"09";
when x"41" => return x"0A";
when x"61" => return x"0A";
when x"42" => return x"0B";
when x"62" => return x"0B";
when x"43" => return x"0C";
when x"63" => return x"0C";
when x"44" => return x"0D";
when x"64" => return x"0D";
when x"45" => return x"0E";
when x"65" => return x"0E";
when x"46" => return x"0F";
when x"66" => return x"0F";
when others => return x"FF";
end case;
end parse_rx_uart;
type digits_t is
record
d3 : std_logic_vector(3
d2 : std_logic_vector(3
d1 : std_logic_vector(3
d0 : std_logic_vector(3
end record;

downto
downto
downto
downto

0);
0);
0);
0);

function parse_digits (data: std_logic_vector(11 downto 0)) return digits_t is
variable remainder : integer;
variable temp
: integer;
variable digits
: digits_t;
begin
temp := to_integer(unsigned(data)) / 1000;
remainder := to_integer(unsigned(data)) mod 1000;
digits.d3 := std_logic_vector(to_unsigned(temp, digits.d3'length));
temp := remainder / 100;
remainder := remainder mod 100;
digits.d2 := std_logic_vector(to_unsigned(temp, digits.d2'length));
temp := remainder / 10;
remainder := remainder mod 10;
digits.d1 := std_logic_vector(to_unsigned(temp, digits.d1'length));
digits.d0 := std_logic_vector(to_unsigned(remainder, digits.d0'length));
return digits;
end parse_digits;
type state_t is (INIT,
CLR_RX,
CLR_TX,
RX_POLL, -- Poll for valid Rx Data
RX_VALID,
RX_READ,
RX_DATA,
GPIO_SET,
GPIO_STROBE_H,
GPIO_STROBE_L,
SPI_READ,
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SPI_WAIT,
TX_DATA,
ERROR);
type reg_t is
record
state
: state_t;
uart_rx_data : std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
gpio_clr : boolean;
digit_count : integer;
strobe_count : integer;
aw : boolean;
w : boolean;
b : boolean;
end record;
constant INIT_REG : reg_t := (state => INIT,
uart_rx_data => (others => '0'),
gpio_clr => false,
digit_count => 5,
strobe_count => 0,
aw => false,
w => false,
b => false);
signal r, r_in : reg_t := INIT_REG;
signal gpio_sel_i : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
signal digits : digits_t;
begin
m_axi_uart_wstrb <= (others => '1');
gpio_sel <= gpio_sel_i;
comb_p : process (

variable v : reg_t;
begin
-- Output defaults
v := r;
m_axi_uart_araddr
m_axi_uart_arvalid
m_axi_uart_awaddr
m_axi_uart_awvalid
m_axi_uart_bready
m_axi_uart_rready
m_axi_uart_wdata
m_axi_uart_wvalid
gpio_strb
spi_enable
err
gpio_sel_i

m_axi_uart_arready, -m_axi_uart_awready,-m_axi_uart_bvalid,-m_axi_uart_rvalid,-m_axi_uart_wready,-spi_busy,
rst_n,
r) is
--

<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=
<=

(others => '0');
'0';
(others => '0');
'0';
'0';
'0';
(others => '0');
'0';
'0';
'0';
'0';
gpio_sel_i;

case r.state is
when INIT =>
v := INIT_REG;
v.state := CLR_RX;
when CLR_RX =>
m_axi_uart_awaddr
m_axi_uart_wdata

<= C_UART_CR_ADDR;
<= x"00000002"; -- Rst RX FIFO

if (r.aw = false) then
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m_axi_uart_awvalid <= '1';
end if;
if (r.w = false) then
m_axi_uart_wvalid <= '1';
end if;
if (r.b = false) then
m_axi_uart_bready <= '1';
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_awready = '1') then
v.aw := true;
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_wready = '1') then
v.w := true;
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_bvalid = '1') then
v.b := true;
if (m_axi_uart_bresp /= "00") then
v.state := ERROR;
end if;
end if;
if ((r.aw = true) and (r.w = true) and (r.b = true)) then
v.state := CLR_TX;
v.aw := false;
v.w := false;
v.b := false;
end if;
when CLR_TX =>
m_axi_uart_awaddr
m_axi_uart_wdata

<= C_UART_CR_ADDR;
<= x"00000001"; -- Rst TX FIFO

if (r.aw = false) then
m_axi_uart_awvalid <= '1';
end if;
if (r.w = false) then
m_axi_uart_wvalid <= '1';
end if;
if (r.b = false) then
m_axi_uart_bready <= '1';
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_awready = '1') then
v.aw := true;
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_wready = '1') then
v.w := true;
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_bvalid = '1') then
v.b := true;
if (m_axi_uart_bresp /= "00") then
v.state := ERROR;
end if;
end if;
if ((r.aw = true) and (r.w = true) and (r.b = true)) then
v.state := RX_POLL;
v.aw := false;
v.w := false;
v.b := false;
end if;
when RX_POLL =>
m_axi_uart_araddr <= C_UART_SR_ADDR;
m_axi_uart_arvalid <= '1';
if (m_axi_uart_arready = '1') then
v.state := RX_VALID;
end if;
when RX_VALID =>
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m_axi_uart_rready <= '1';
if (m_axi_uart_rvalid = '1') then
if (m_axi_uart_rresp /= "00") then
v.state := ERROR;
elsif (m_axi_uart_rdata(7 downto 4) /= "0000") then
v.state := ERROR;
elsif (m_axi_uart_rdata(0) = '1') then
v.state := RX_READ;
else
v.state := RX_POLL;
end if;
end if;
when RX_READ =>
m_axi_uart_araddr <= C_UART_RX_ADDR;
m_axi_uart_arvalid <= '1';
if (m_axi_uart_arready = '1') then
v.state := RX_DATA;
end if;
when RX_DATA =>
m_axi_uart_rready <= '1';
if (m_axi_uart_rvalid = '1') then
v.uart_rx_data := parse_rx_uart(m_axi_uart_rdata(7 downto 0));
v.state
:= GPIO_SET;
end if;
when GPIO_SET =>
if (r.gpio_clr = false) then
gpio_sel_i
<= x"F";
else
gpio_sel_i
<= r.uart_rx_data(3 downto 0);
end if;
if(r.strobe_count /= 50) then -- let gpio signals settle
v.strobe_count := r.strobe_count + 1;
else
v.strobe_count := 0;
v.state := GPIO_STROBE_H;
end if;
when GPIO_STROBE_H =>
gpio_strb <= '1';
-- Decoder chip requires a strobe of at least 250ns (25 clks) in width
if(r.strobe_count /= 50) then
v.strobe_count := r.strobe_count + 1;
else
v.strobe_count := 0;
v.state := GPIO_STROBE_L;
end if;
when GPIO_STROBE_L =>
if(r.strobe_count /= 50) then
v.strobe_count := r.strobe_count + 1;
else
v.strobe_count := 0;
if (r.gpio_clr = false) then
v.gpio_clr := true;
v.state
:= GPIO_SET;
else
v.gpio_clr := false;
v.state
:= SPI_READ;
end if;
end if;
when SPI_READ =>
spi_enable <= '1';
if (spi_busy = '1') then
v.state := SPI_WAIT;
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end if;
when SPI_WAIT =>
if (spi_busy = '0') then
v.state := TX_DATA;
digits <= parse_digits(spi_rxdata(12 downto 1));
end if;
when TX_DATA =>
m_axi_uart_awaddr <= C_UART_TX_ADDR;
if (r.digit_count = 5) then
m_axi_uart_wdata(7 downto 0) <= x"3" &
elsif (r.digit_count = 4) then
m_axi_uart_wdata(7 downto 0) <= x"3" &
elsif (r.digit_count = 3) then
m_axi_uart_wdata(7 downto 0) <= x"3" &
elsif (r.digit_count = 2) then
m_axi_uart_wdata(7 downto 0) <= x"3" &
elsif (r.digit_count = 1) then
m_axi_uart_wdata(7 downto 0) <= x"0A";
else
m_axi_uart_wdata(7 downto 0) <= x"0D";
end if;

digits.d3;
digits.d2;
digits.d1;
digits.d0;
-- Newline
-- Carraige Return

if (r.aw = false) then
m_axi_uart_awvalid <= '1';
end if;
if (r.w = false) then
m_axi_uart_wvalid <= '1';
end if;
if (r.b = false) then
m_axi_uart_bready <= '1';
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_awready = '1') then
v.aw := true;
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_wready = '1') then
v.w := true;
end if;
if (m_axi_uart_bvalid = '1') then
v.b := true;
if (m_axi_uart_bresp /= "00") then
v.state := ERROR;
elsif (r.digit_count /= 0) then
v.digit_count := r.digit_count - 1;
else
v.state := RX_POLL;
v.digit_count := 5;
end if;
end if;
if ((r.aw = true) and (r.w = true) and (r.b = true)) then
v.aw := false;
v.w := false;
v.b := false;
end if;
when ERROR =>
v.state := ERROR;
err <= '1';
when others =>
v.state := INIT;
end case;
if (rst_n = '0') then
v.state
:= INIT;
end if;
r_in <= v;
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end process;
sync_p : process(clk)
begin
if (rising_edge(clk)) then
r <= r_in;
end if;
end process;
end rtl;
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SPI Master
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Engineer: Daniel Bovard
--- Create Date: 04/11/2021 11:52:01 AM
-- Design Name: Data Acquisition System
-- Module Name: spi_master - rtl
-- Target Devices: XC7A100T-CSG324
-- Tool Versions: Vivado 2019.1
-- Description:
-SPI Master module for IDS ICS Thesis.
-This module was derived from the open source model provided by Digikey:
-https://forum.digikey.com/t/spi-master-vhdl/12717
--This SPI Master is responsible for providing a slave with an SPI SCLK
-and retrieving a data packet over the MISO line. Since slave selecting
-is performed via an external 4x16 decoder, the slave select functionality
-was removed from this module.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.std_logic_arith.all;
use ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all;
entity spi_master is
generic(
slaves : integer := 4; --number of spi slaves
d_width : integer := 2); --data bus width
port(
clock
: in
std_logic;
reset_n : in
std_logic;
enable : in
std_logic;
cpol
: in
std_logic;
cpha
: in
std_logic;
clk_div : in
integer;
per 1/2 period of sclk
miso
: in
std_logic;
sclk
: out
std_logic;
busy
: out
std_logic;
signal
rx_data : out
std_logic_vector(d_width-1 downto 0));
end spi_master;

type

architecture logic of spi_master is
type machine is(ready, execute);

signal
signal
signal
sclk from system
signal
toggles
signal
signal
location
signal

state
clk_ratio
count
clock
clk_toggles

--system clock
--asynchronous reset
--initiate transaction
--spi clock polarity
--spi clock phase
--system clock cycles
--master in, slave out
--spi clock
--busy / data ready
--data received

--state machine data

: machine;
: integer;
: integer;

--current state
--current clk_div
--counter to trigger

: integer range 0 to d_width*2 + 1;

--count spi clock

rx_buffer
: std_logic_vector(d_width-1 downto 0); --receive data buffer
last_bit_rx : integer range 0 to d_width*2;
--last rx data bit
sclk_i

: std_logic;

begin
sclk <= sclk_i;
process(clock, reset_n)
begin
if(reset_n = '0') then
--reset system
busy <= '1';
--set busy signal
rx_data <= (others => '0'); --clear receive data port
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state <= ready;

--go to ready state when reset is exited

elsif(clock'event and clock = '1') then
case state is
--state machine
when ready =>
busy <= '0';
--clock out not busy signal
rx_buffer <= (others => '0');
if(clk_div = 0) then
--check for valid spi speed
clk_ratio <= 1;
--set to maximum speed if zero
count <= 1;
--initiate system-to-spi clock counter
else
clk_ratio <= clk_div; --set to input selection if valid
count <= clk_div;
--initiate system-to-spi clock counter
end if;
sclk_i <= cpol;
--set spi clock polarity
clk_toggles <= 0;
--initiate clock toggle counter
last_bit_rx <= d_width*2 + conv_integer(cpha) - 1; --set last rx data

bit

--user input to initiate transaction
if(enable = '1') then
busy <= '1';
--set busy signal
state <= execute;
--proceed to execute state
else
state <= ready;
--remain in ready state
end if;
when execute =>
busy <= '1';

--set busy signal

--system clock to sclk ratio is met
if(count = clk_ratio) then
count <= 1;
--reset system-to-spi clock counter
if(clk_toggles = d_width*2 + 1) then
clk_toggles <= 0;
--reset spi clock toggles counter
else
clk_toggles <= clk_toggles + 1; --increment spi clock toggles

counter

end if;
--spi clock toggle needed
if(clk_toggles <= d_width*2) then
if (sclk_i = '0') then
sclk_i <= '1';
else
sclk_i <= '0';
end if;
end if;

received bit

--receive spi clock toggle
if((clk_toggles < last_bit_rx + 1) and (sclk_i = '0')) then
rx_buffer <= rx_buffer(d_width-2 downto 0) & miso; --shift in
end if;
--end of transaction
if(clk_toggles = d_width*2
busy <= '0';
rx_data <= rx_buffer;
state <= ready;
else
state <= execute;
end if;

- 1) then
--clock out not busy signal
--clock out received data to output port
--return to ready state
--not end of transaction
--remain in execute state

else
--system clock to sclk ratio not met
count <= count + 1; --increment counter
state <= execute;
--remain in execute state
end if;
end case;
end if;

149
end process;
end logic;
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Xilinx AXI UARTLite LogiCORE IP Configuration
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Project Constraint File
## ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------## ICS IDS Nexys4 DDR Project Constraint file
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# Clock signal
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN E3 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports clk]
create_clock -period 10.000 -name sys_clk -waveform {0.000 5.000} -add [get_ports
clk]

## LEDs

set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN H17 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports err]

set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN J13 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports
{flash_led[0]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN N14 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports
{flash_led[1]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN R18 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports
{flash_led[2]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN V17 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports
{flash_led[3]}]

set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN V15 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_led[0]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN V14 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_led[1]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN V12 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_led[2]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN V11 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_led[3]}]

##Buttons

set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN C12 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports rst_n]

##Pmod Headers
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##Pmod Header JB

set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN D14 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_sel[0]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN F16 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_sel[1]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN G16 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_sel[2]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN H14 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports {gpio_sel[3]}]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN E16 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports gpio_strb]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN F13 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports miso]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN G13 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports sclk]

##USB-RS232 Interface

set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN C4 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports rx]
set_property -dict {PACKAGE_PIN D4 IOSTANDARD LVCMOS33} [get_ports tx]

